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JACK W. PETERSON,
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final Judgment entered by the Honorable Kevin K. Allen of the
First Judicial District Court on August 6, 2009, pursuant to the Memorandum Decision issued
on July 20, 2009, which modifies the trial court's original Judgment dated May 6, 2009 and
Memorandum Decision issued April 17, 2009. The respective Judgment and Memorandum
Decision documents are attached hereto as Addenda A through D. The Utah Supreme Court has
original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) and Rules 3
and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This matter was transferred to the Utah Court
of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court commit error by failing to make sufficient findings
justifying the applicability of Townsend's market approach, including sufficient findings
to demonstrate that companies used in Townsend's market approach are comparable to
PAJ given the vast discrepancy between Townsend's market and income approaches?
Standard of Review: "It is the duty of the trial court to make findings on all
material issues raised by the pleadings, and the failure to do so is regarded as reversible
error." See Piper v. Hatch, 86 Utah 292, 43 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1935). In order for
findings to be sufficient they ".. .must show that the court's judgment or decree follows
logically from, and is supported by, the evidence. The findings should be sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached." See Rasband v Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331,
1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Acton v Deliran, 131 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court held in Hogle v. Zinetics Medical Inc., 63 P.3d 80, 86
(Utah 2002) that"... choice of valuation methods is a question of law." The Court
further indicated that: "We note that the selection of guideline companies was part of the
determination of market value, which is one of the three primary valuation models." Id. at
87. "[W]hile the ultimate determination of fair value is a question of fact, the
determination of whether a given fact or circumstance is relevant to fair value under
[state law] is a question of law we review de novo" Id. at 84 (internal citations omitted).
2

Issue No. 2: Did the trial court commit error by including each of the
shareholders' personal goodwill in reaching its conclusion as to the fair value of PAJ
shares and by failing to make sufficient findings?
Standard of Review: The question of personal goodwill in determining fair value
in either a dissenting shareholder action or an election to purchase case is a matter of first
impression in Utah. However, in Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 176 P.3d 476 (Utah 2008),
the Utah Court of Appeals did find that valuing a business in a divorce case ".. .should be
determined independent of any goodwill component. There can be no good will in a
business that is dependent for its existence upon the individual who conducts the
enterprise and would vanish were the individual to die, retire or quit work." Id. at 490.
Issue No. 3: Did the trial court commit error by relying on an incorrect
calculation of Jackson's 2001 buy-in purchase price and the buy-in multiple in reaching
its conclusion as to the fair value of the PAJ shares?
Standard of Review: A mathematical error constitutes an error correctible under
Rule 60(a) URCP. See Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Insurance, 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah
1983); See also as cited above...Hogle v. Zinetics Medical, Inc., 63 P.3d 80, 86 (Utah
2002).
Preservation of Issues on Appeal: The foregoing issues were preserved in the
trial court by PAJ's filing of its Motion to Amend and as set forth in its pleadings. See
Addendum F; TR at 688 and 875.
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APPLICABLE STATUTE
The following statutory provisions are of central importance to this appeal and are
attached hereto as Addendum G: Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1430; Utah Code Ann. § 1610a-1434.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition. Peterson held a 36.37%
interest in PAJ, a Certified Public Accounting firm. On November 2, 2006 Peterson filed his
Verified Complaint seeking judicial dissolution of PAJ under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1430.
See Verified Complaint, TR at 001. Four days later, PAJ made an election to purchase
Peterson's shares at fair value in lieu of Dissolution as authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a1434. See Counterclaim, TR at 085. Thereafter PAJ filed its Answer and a Counterclaim. See
Counterclaim, TR at 085. This case was originally assigned to Judge Gordon Low. Peterson
brought two separate Motions for Temporary Restraining Order on November 2, 2006 and
January 19, 2007, which were each denied. See Motion for TROs, TR at 022 and 098. Judge
Low retired from the bench during September 2007. Ultimately, Governor Huntsman appointed
the Honorable Kevin K. Allen as the new First District Court Judge to replace Judge Low and
this case was assigned to Judge Allen.

I

A bench trial was held on February 18, 19, and 20, 2009 to determine, inter alia, the fair
value of PAJ shares. See Trial Transcript, TR at 1045. The trial court issued its original
Memorandum Decision on April 17, 2009 and entered its original Judgment on May 6, 2009.
See Addendum C andD; TR at 613 and 675.
4

Thereafter, PAJ filed a Motion to Amend the Findings or Make Additional Findings
under Rule 52(b), Motion for Amendment of Judgment under Rule 59(a), Motion for Relief
from Judgment under Rule 60(a), (b)(1) and b(6), and a Motion for Stay under Rule 62(b) dated
May 15, 2009. See Addendum F; TR at 688; See infra.
As a result of PAJ's Motion, the trial court issued a second Memorandum Decision dated
July 20, 209 and amended Judgment dated August 6, 2009. See Addendum A andB; TR at 910
and 977. The trial court ultimately dismissed Peterson's petition to dissolve PAJ and awarded
PAJ the right to purchase Peterson's shares effective December 31, 2006 and valued Peterson's
shares at $459,000. See Addendum A; TR at 977.
PAJ contends that as a matter of law, the trial court committed several errors in reaching
its conclusion as to the "fair value" of Peterson's shares and further failed to make sufficient
findings.
B.

Statement of Facts.

1.

On September 11, 2007, under stipulation and Order of the trial court, the

parties established the effective date of the purchase of Peterson's shares to be December
31, 2006, rather than the Verified Complaint date of November 4, 2006. The stipulation
tied the date for establishing "fair value" of Peterson's shares to a date consistent with the
end of Peterson's employment and with PAJ's year-end accounting. See Order, TR at
421.
2.

As part of a case management plan, the parties stipulated to a simultaneous

exchange of expert reports regarding the fair value of PAJ, which reports were exchanged
5

by September 8, 2008. See Scheduling and Discovery Order, TR at 436; See
Simultaneous Filing of Expert Valuation Reports, TR at 445. Peterson retained Brad
Townsend ("Townsend") as his expert and PAJ retained Tyler Bowles ("Bowles") as
expert witness.
3.

The calculations of the value of Peterson's Shares in PAJ were calculated

as of December 31, 2006.
4.

Townsend opined as to PAJ's fair value as follows:
Valuation Method

Value

i.

Income Approach1

$724,366 to $744,409

ii.

Market Approach2

$1,098,094 to $1,963,581

iii.

Asset Approach3

$375,019

See Townsend Report, Schedule A, Trial Exhibit 90.
5.

Townsend then calculated PAJ's value by weighing the values of each

method as follows; 40% income approach; 60% Market approach, 0% asset approach.
See Id.
6.

Townsend concluded that the Fair Value of PAJ as an entity was

$1,263,086, which equated to a value of $459,000 for Peterson's 36.37% interest. See Id.
7.

Bowles opined as to PAJ's fair value of PAJ after adjusting for personal

goodwill as follows:
1 Capitalization of Earning
2 Historical Transaction
3 Excess Earnings
6

Valuation method

Value

Income Approach

$581,084

Market Approach

$712,556

Asset Approach

$617,649

See Bowles Report, Exhibit 8, pg. 21, Trial Exhibit 90.
8.

Bowles then reasoned that "the excess earnings method with the adjustment

made for personal goodwill is the most applicable method" and then concluded that the
fair value of PAJ as an entity was $617,649, which equated to a value of $224,639 for
Peterson's 36.37% interest. See Id.
9.

As a result of the disparity in valuation, the parties were unable to reach a

resolution of the case, resulting in the matter being scheduled for a three-day bench trial,
which ultimately occurred February 18-20, 2009. The trial court issued its initial
Memorandum Decision on April 17, 2009 and adopted Townsend's calculation of "fair
value," and held Peterson was not entitled to any additional distributions, held there was
no oppressive conduct by PAJ, and denied costs and attorney fees to both parties. See
Addendum C and D; TR at 613 and 675.
10.

Thereafter, PAJ filed a Motion for Amendment of Judgment under Rule

59(a) URCP, Motion for Relief from Judgment under Rules 60(a), 60(b)(1), and 60(b)(6)
URCP, Motion to Amend Findings or make Additional Findings under Rule 52(b)
URCP, and a Motion to Stay under Rule 62(b) URCP, with supporting memoranda,

7

giving the trial court an opportunity to correct the errors and insufficient findings asserted
below. See Addendum F; TR at 688 and 875; See supra.
11.

Peterson then filed his Motion to Partially Amend or Alter Judgment under

Rules 59(e) and 60 URCP. See Addendum G; TR at 708.
12.

The trial court issued an amended Memorandum Decision dated July 20,

2009 and a subsequent amended Judgment dated August 6, 2009. See Addendum A and
B; TR at 910 and 977. The Judgment incorporated the Court's Memorandum Decision as
its findings of fact and conclusions of law. It is from this final Judgment, that PAJ
appeals. Id.

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court erred in failing to make sufficient findings of fact that would allow the
parties and the Court of Appeals to follow the conclusions it made in its Memorandum
Decisions. PAJ preserved these issues by filing its Rule 52 Motion to Amend Findings.
Without the additional findings, PAJ cannot determine how the trial court came to its
conclusions regarding the value of PAJ shares.
The trial court further erred in failing to appropriately consider the issue of personal
goodwill, which is a matter of first impression in Utah regarding dissenting shareholder actions
and the election to purchase in lieu of dissolution. The trial court erred in concluding that the
undisputed Non-Solicitation Agreement converted all of the shareholders' goodwill to personal
enterprise goodwill.
The trial court likewise erred when it failed to correct a mathematical error regarding the
Jackson 2001 buy-in, and by so doing, relied on a value of PAJ shares well in excess of the
appropriate value had the error been corrected.

9

ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE SUFFICIENT FINDINGS
JUSTIFYING THE APPLICABILITY OF TOWNSEND'S MARKET
APPROACH, INCLUDING SUFFICIENT FINDINGS TO DEMONSTRATE
THAT COMPANIES USED IN TOWNSEND'S MARKET APPROACH
ARE COMPARABLE TO PAJ.

Standard of Review
"It is the duty of the trial court to make findings on all material issues raised by the
pleadings, and the failure to do so is regarded as reversible error." See Piper v. Hatch, 86 Utah
292, 43 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1935). In order for findings to be sufficient they ".. .must show that
the court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence. The
findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps
by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." See Rasband v Rasband,
752 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Acton v Deliran, 137 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah
1987) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Necessity of sufficient findings
"It is the duty of the trial court to make findings on all material issues raised by the
pleadings, and the failure to do so is regarded as reversible error."4
In order for findings to be sufficient they ".. .must show that the court's judgment
or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence. The findings should
4 Piper v. Hatch, 86 Utah 292, 43 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1935) (citing Piper v. Eakle, 78
Utah, 342, 2 P.(2d) 909; Dillon Implement Co. v. Cleaveland, 32 Utah, 1, 88 P. 670;
Thomas v. Clayton Piano Co., 47 Utah, 91, 151 P. 543; Mitchell v. Jensen, 29 Utah, 346,
81 P. 165; Thomas v. Farrell, 82 Utah, 535, 26 P.(2d) 328.)
10

be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached."5
To state it another way, the trial court's findings "should ... include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual
issue was reached." RehnvRehn, 91A P.2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (omission in
original) (quoting Stevens v Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958).
This Court held in Bell v Bell 810 P.2d 489, 492 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), "the trial
court must make sufficiently detailed findings of fact on each factor to enable a reviewing
court to ensure that the trial court's discretionary determination was rationally based...".
This Court further pointed out that "[t]he absence of findings of fact 'is a
fundamental defect that makes it impossible to review the issues that were briefed
without invading the trial court's fact-finding domain.'" Bakanowski v. Bankanowski, 80
P.3d 153, 156 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Acton v Deliaran, 131 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah
1987)).
Thus, "[A] trial court's failure to provide adequate findings is reversible error
when the facts are not clear form the record."6
PAJ preserved its right to appeal question of insufficient findings

5 RasbandvRasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Acton v
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
6 Andrus v. Andrus, 169 P.3d 754, 759 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). See Rasband v Rasband,
752 P.2d 1331, 1334-35 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)).
11

The trial court's May 6, 2009 Judgment did not include "Findings of Fact" or
"Conclusions of Law." Rather it incorporated the trial court's April 17, 2009 Decision
pursuant to Rule 52(a) URCP. See TR at 67.5.
PAJ then timely filed its Motion to Amend Findings op Make Additional Findings
under Rule 52(b) URCP. See Addendum F; TR at 688 and 8f5.
In response, the trial court issued is second Memorandum Decision on July 20,
2009. In the subsequent August 6, 2009 Judgment, the trial court again simply
incorporated its prior Decisions rather than providing separate "Findings of Fact" or
"Conclusions of Law". PAJ submits that the trial court has yet to make sufficient
findings.
Insufficient findings regarding comparability of Townsend's market sample
Before the trial court can begin the weighting of any market approach, it must first
determine if the proposed market approaches are comparable. The Hogle Court
determined that the experts' values should be "substantially disregarded as unreliable"
precisely because the comparables offered were not comparable. Id. at 88.
The trial court's initial Decision did not contain a single finding to support
comparability of PAJ to the companies Townsend used in his market analysis. Even after
the trial court was given the opportunity to make additional findings, the court
supplemented its findings with only the following statement}

7 See Hogle v Zinetics Med, Inc., 63 P.3d 80, 87 (Utah 2002).
12

"Townsend's market analysis data was comparable to and appropriately
considered in the valuation of PAJ, as shown by a high correlation of PAJ of 0.92.
Townsend testified that such a high correlation was rare and therefore determined the
market approach to be very appealing in determining value for this particular company."
(Citing Trial Testimony, February 18, 2009.) See Addendum B; TR at 910, pg. 6, f 3.
This single finding poses two problems: First, it demonstrates a misunderstanding
of the statistical term R-squared and the application of .92. Second, the trial court failed
to make the subsequent findings that would make the number relevant to the valuation of
PAJ. Absent these accurate and detailed findings, a reviewing court cannot ensure that
the trial court applied correct law or that its discretionary determination was rationally
based.
Incorrect application of .928
The trial court's finding that relies on "a high correlation to PAJ of 0.92" leads one
to conclude that the trial court does not understand the statistical term R-squared—.92 is
the calculated R-squared value.
The trial court may have even mistakenly thought the .92 was equivalent to the ".9
times earnings" the trial court references elsewhere in its opinion. See Issue III infra.
Unfortunately, one cannot tell given the limited findings.
In statistics, R-squared is a defined term. It is the coefficient of determination and
is used in models whose main purpose is to predict future outcomes based on related data.
8 "You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means." Reiner,
Rob, The Princess Bride, Act III Communications, 1987
13

"But there are problems with R-squared. First, it measures in-sample goodness of fit in
the sense of how close an estimated Y value is to its actual value in the given sample.
There is no guarantee that is will forecast well out of sample observations."9
R-squared, by definition, only measures how well a particular sample is clustered
around a given point. R-squared is a mechanical calculation that summarizes a
characteristic of a sample.
Simply put, one cannot gather a sample of one-year old pigs, take an average of
their weight, and use it to estimate the average weight of a pen of one-year old cows. The
fact that the R-squared for the sample of pigs (e.g., the weights of the one-year old pigs
were all close to the same), does not make the average weight of pigs at one year of age a
good basis for estimating the average weight of a one-year old cow.
Statistics may at times be difficult to grasp, but the trial court owes it to the parties
to understand the statistical concepts cited in is decision. It appears the trial court did not.
Townsend ran a statistical regression model with his chosen market samples
comparing their selling price to one or more variables. Townsend testified that at least
one of the regression models he ran produced an R-squared of .92.10
Since the court did not understand R-squared, it did not identify the variable "Y"
on which the court believed Townsend ran his statistical regression to obtain an Rsquaredof .92.

9 Basic Econometrics, 5th ed. 2009, p. 493, Damodar N. Gugarati and Dawn C. Porter.
10 See Trial Transcript, pg. 85, lines 18-21, TR at 1045.
14

Townsend could have run several different statistical regression models on these
same companies comparing their sale price to any number of variables: number of
employees; number of partners; geographical location, or number of bald employees.
Presumably the R-squared in each analysis would have been different. To understand
Townsend's reference to .92 one must understand it relates to a particular variable among
Townsend's sample companies. It does not relate to the comparability of PAJ to the
sample companies. It also does not predict the value of PAJ absent a finding that PAJ is
comparable to the companies used in the sample.
It was error for the trial court to find that Townsend's R-squared value, in and of
itself, establishes comparability between PAJ and Townsend's market samples.
Insufficient findings
Even after Townsend's variable "Y" used to derive his R-squared of .92 is
identified, the only way Townsend's R-squared of .92 would be relevant in determining
the value of PAJ is if Townsend's sampling of subject companies are comparable to PAJ.
For findings to be sufficient they must contain enough detail to ensure the trial
court correctly applied the law and that the trial court's discretionary determination was
rationally based.
The trial court did not make sufficient findings on the issue of "if' and "how" PAJ
is comparable to Townsend's market samples to allow for an appropriate appellate review
of the decision. Simply stated, the trial court did not say why he thought the "cow" was
similar to the "pigs."
15

PAJ illustrates the insufficiency of the trial courts findings as follows:
First, the trial court does not tie its finding to specific underlying evidence; it only
references an entire day of trial rather than any particular testimony. Leaving one to
guess at the specific evidence on which the trial court relied.
Second, the finding fails to demonstrate why the trial court considered
Townsend's market samples relevant in valuing PAJ in spite of the following:
1.

PAJ had annual sales of $l,583,495 n . Of the 53 transactions that

Townsend used spanning over ten years, 51 had annual sales under $650,000 and 30 had
annual sales under $300,000. None had annual sales over $1,250,000.12 1314 15

11 See Townsend's Report, Schedule B.
12 See Bowles Report, Appendix F, and Townsend Report, pg. 21, Schedules O & P.
13 The Utah Supreme Court engaged in a detailed analysis of market comparables in
Hogle v Zinetics Med., Inc., 63 P.3d 80 (Utah 2002). The Hogle Court rejected the
market approach proposed by Zinetics precisely because comparable companies could
not be found. Id. at 86-88. The Hogle Court concluded by stating that because the
comparables were not comparable, the expert's values should be "substantially
disregarded as unreliable." Id. at 88.
14 There had to be hundreds (perhaps thousands) of transactions involving ownership
interests in accounting firms in the few years before 2006. Two take a handful of
transactions from small firms in Florida and make any inferences about a much larger
firm in Logan, may be less reasonable that guessing cow weights based on pig data,
regardless of an R-squared value relating to the sample of small Florida firms.
15 Mr. Shannon Pratt (a recognized and well published expert in the field of business
valuation) noted this problem with incomparable companies when he stated "probably
the most common shortcoming implementation to the market approach is the one that
takes place near the beginning of the exercise, poor selection of guideline companies."
See Pratt, Shannon P. The Market Approach to Valuing Business, (John Wiley & Sons:
New York), 2001, 253; Trial Exhibit 94.6 (hereinafter uPratt Approach to Valuing
Business ").
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The following graph illustrates this point. This was admitted as Trial Exhibit 94.1.
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Townsend did not disclose in his report, and initially denied during cross
(but ultimately acknowledged )5 he had excluded from his sampling,

companies with gross revenue under $100,000.

16 See Trial Transcript, pg. 122, line 25, TR at 1045.
17 See Trial Transcript, pg. 123, line 25, TR at 1045.
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3.

Townsend' s methodologies varied by over 271 % among themselves

ranging from $724,336 to $1,963,581.1819 20
4.

Townsend acknowledged in Cross Examination that he had no information

regarding: the mix of revenue; number of partners; revenue per partner; number of
employees; revenue per employee; firm specialty practice; niche practice; or,
demographics of population where the firm is located about any of the companies he
91

included in his market analysis.

Townsend acknowledged in Cross Examination there
99

is so much more we do not know about his "comparables" than what we do know.
5.

The trial court failed to reconcile its determination of the fair value of PAJ

($1,263,086) with the required rate of return to owners of the corporation given its
finding on the amount of reasonable compensation in the amount of $273,84423 (i.e., the

18 Townsend's Report, Schedule A, Trial Exhibit 90.
19 This Court has noted that the market price is reliable only when "the evidence reveals
the existence of a free and open market, characterized by a substantial volume of
transactions that makes the market a fair reflection of the judgment of the investing
public." See Bingham Consolidation Company v. Groesbeck, 105 P.3d 365 (Utah Ct.
App. 2005).
20 Other jurisdictions have held that "The utility of the comparable company approach
depends upon the similarity between the company the court is valuing and the companies
used for comparison. At some point, the differences become so large that the use of the
comparable company method becomes meaningless for valuation purposes." See In re
Radiology Associates, Inc., 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del.Ch.1991); See also Steiner v
Benninghoff, 5 F.Supp.2d 1117, 1127 (D. Nevada 1998.
21 See Trial Transcript, vol. 1; pg. 15, TR at 1045.
22 See Trial Transcript, vol. 1; pg. 130, lines 13-22, TR at 1045.
23 Townsend Report, Schedule B, Trial Exhibit 90.
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trial court's fair value of $1,263,086 , and reasonable compensation of $273,844 does
not provide a reasonable rate of return to the owners).
Specific findings on each of these issues are necessary for the parties and the
appellate court to review the trial courts choice of valuation methods. Even if some of
these issues are ultimately questions of fact, they must be specifically addressed by the
trial court. "The absence of findings of fact 'is a fundamental defect that makes it
impossible to review the issues that were briefed without invading the trial court's factfinding domain.'" Bakanowski at 156 (citing Acton v. Deliran, 731 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah
1987).
PAJ respectfully requests this Court remand the case, advising the trial court on
the definition of R-squared, and further instructing the trial court to articulate additional
findings addressing all relevant issues that would allow an Appellate Court to logically
evaluate whether the trial court properly concluded whether or not Townsend's market
data is comparable to PAJ and therefore whether Townsend's market data is a properly
chosen valuation method. Only then can the Appeal Court review as a matter of law the
trial court's choice of valuation methods.
The Utah Supreme Court held in Hogle v. Zinetics Medical, Inc., 63 P.3d 80, 86
(Utah 2002) (citing Swope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 243 F.3d 486, at 491) that"... choice of
valuation methods is a question of law." The Court further indicated that: "We note that
the selection of guideline companies was part of the determination of market value,

24 Townsend Report, Schedule A, Trial Exhibit 90.
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which is one of the three primary valuation models." Id. at 87. While the ultimate
determination of fair value of a corporation's stock is a question of fact, the
determination of whether a given fact or circumstance is relevant to fair value under state
law is a question of law reviewed de novo. Id. at 80.
II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY INCLUDING EACH OF
THE SHAREHOLDER'S PERSONAL GOODWILL IN REACHING ITS
CONCLUSION AS TO THE FAIR VALUE OF PAJ SHARES AND BY
FAILING TO MAKE SUFFICIENT FINDINGS
Allocation of personal goodwill when determining fair value in either a dissenting
shareholder action or an election to purchase is a case of first impression in Utah.
Case law on personal goodwill
In Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 176 P.3d 476 (Utah 2008), the Utah Supreme
Court held that the value of a business in a divorce case ".. .should be determined
independent of any goodwill component. There can be no goodwill in a business that is
dependent for its existence upon the individual who conducts the enterprise and would
vanish were the individual to die, retire or quit work." Id. at 490.
Other jurisdictions have distinguished between enterprise and personal goodwill in
valuing businesses. The US Supreme Court in Prince v Unsecured Creditors Committee,
117 S.Ct. 608 (1996), cited both In re Marriage ofZells, 143 111. 2d 251, 572 N.E. 2d 946
(1991) and In re Marriage ofTalty, 166 I11.2d 232, 209 Ill.Dec. 790, 652 N.E.2d 330
(1995), "citing Zells as holding 'goodwill represents merely the ability to acquire future
income', and that that case involved a professional practice wherein goodwill is generally
20

personal to the professional, and the case went on to make the following distinction: to
the extent goodwill inheres in the business, existing independently of the individual's
personal efforts, and will outlast his involvement with the enterprise, it should be
considered as an asset of the business, and, in contrast, to the extent that goodwill of the
business is personal to the individual, depends on his efforts and will cease when his
involvement ends, it should not be considered property (it is income generating ability
that goes with the person)" See Prince v Unsecured Creditors Committee, 117 S.Ct. 608
(1996), (emphasis added).
The US Supreme Court further noted that "Forcing a professional to purchase his
own personal goodwill as being part of a corporation's stock value was taking away what
the professional personally owned and charging the professional for his own income
generating ability as being a corporate asset contrary to the holdings of the Illinois
Supreme Court as well as the future earnings exemption of 11 U.S.C. §541(6)." Id.
(emphasis added).
PAJ's Employment Agreement
It is undisputed that all three shareholders in PAJ had signed employment
agreements which included the following clause:
2.0 I will not -1.

For a period of two years after the termination of this agreement:

a. Directly or indirectly solicit to provide or provide any professional
services such as those provided by the Employer for anyone who was a client of the
Employer anytime during the twelve months prior to the termination of my employment
21

with the Employer. This provision does not apply to clients who are my immediate
family members.
See Employment Agreements, Trial Exhibit 46, 53 and 54, pg. 1; Peterson
Employment Agreement, Addendum H.
The Employment Agreement does not prevent any shareholder from opening up a
competing business next door. They simply cannot solicit certain customers for a two
year period from termination of employment.
The trial court's error
The trial court determined that "Townsend's exclusion of any personal goodwill
deduction was appropriate where that expert gave considerable weight to Plaintiffs
employment contract, and opined that such constructively affixed any of Plaintiff s
personal goodwill with PAJ as an enterprise. As Townsend testified, where personal
goodwill has become transferable, it is no longer personal. Further, how Bowles
extrapolated personal goodwill in his calculations was in error and excluded the benefit
of the bargain." See Memorandum Decision, Addendum B atpg. 6; TR at 910.
However, as indicated above, the Stonehocker Court determined that there "can be
no goodwill in a business that is dependent for its existence upon the individual who
conducts the enterprise and would vanish were the individual to die, retire or quit work."
See Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 176 P.3d 476, 490 (Utah 2008). Clearly one who dies or
retires will not be soliciting clients (at least not for two years). And if something as
serious as death cannot convert personal goodwill to enterprise goodwill, then certainly a
two year non-solicitation agreement cannot do so as a matter of law. In short, PAJ
22

contends that under the standard articulated in Stonehocker, the two year non-solicitation
clause cannot as a matter of law convert all personal goodwill to enterprise goodwill.
The trial court's failure to account for personal goodwill was in error.
The trial court's other findings are also inconsistent with its position that the nonsolicitation agreement converted all personal goodwill. On Page 8 of the trial court's
April 17 2009 Memorandum Decision, the court stated: "the Court views the securities
license much like a college degree or certification from the state as a CPA. It runs with
the person, not the entity." See Memorandum Decision, Addendum D atpg. 8; TR at
613.
The trial court cannot have it both ways. If a college degree and certification runs
with the person, then the personal goodwill related thereto runs with the person. Each
shareholder in this case holds inter alia a college degree or certification from the state as
a CPA. If they run with the person then the value associated therewith must also run with
the person.
Bowles was the only expert to assign a value to personal goodwill in his Expert
Report. See Bowles Report, Exhibit 8, pg. 17-20, Trial Exhibit 90. The trial court
committed error by failing to adjust the value of the PAJ shares by offsetting the personal
goodwill attributed to each shareholder as provided in Bowles' Expert Report and
consistent with his testimony. See TR at 1045, pg. 36, lines 14 through pg. 37.
The insufficiency of the findings regarding goodwill
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The trial court's finding regarding goodwill is insufficient. As asserted
previously, in order for a finding to be sufficient it must "show that the court's judgment
or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence. The findings should
be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached."
The trial court's finding has no reference to the language relied upon in the
Employment Agreement, no reference to the testimony of Townsend it relied upon, no
analysis as to whether the shareholders' goodwill has in fact become institutionalized and
how that occurred, no reference to the evidence or a statement of law determining "how
Bowles extrapolated personal goodwill in his calculations was in error and excluded the
benefit of the bargain," etc. The trial court's finding simply has no direct tie back to the
trial record and fails to include the "subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which it
reached its ultimate conclusion."
For these reasons, the issue of goodwill should be remanded to the trial court to
determine the value of personal goodwill of its shareholders with instructions to exclude
such from the fair value of PAJ and make sufficient findings related thereto.

Ill
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY RELYING ON AN
INCORRECT CALCULATION OF JACKSON'S 2001 BUY-IN PURCHASE
PRICE AND THE BUY-IN MULTIPLE IN REACHING ITS
25 See Rasband v Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Acton v
Deliran, 137 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
26 See Memorandum Decision, Addendum B atpg. 6; TR at 910.
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CONCLUSION AS TO THE FAIR VALUE OF THE PAJ SHARES
A mathematical error constitutes an error correctible under Rule 60(a) URCP.27
The trial court stated in its April 17, 2009 Memorandum Decision that "Scott
Jackson bought his shares using a value calculation of the gross sales times 0.9, times the
percentage of stock (i.e., $750,000 *.9 * 15.83% = 106,852.50). See Ex. 83. Applying
this formula to the Plaintiffs shares would result in his shares being worth
$517,763.17."28 The trial court also stated that while "...the Court will not apply this
value calculation as the sole means of determining the value of the Plaintiffs shares;
however, the Court does view this transaction between Mr. Jackson and then Peterson,
Allred as a guidepost in its decision." Id. atpg. 7(emphasis added). The trial court went
on to note, two paragraphs later, that: "The Court points out that this determined value
[Townsend's value] is less than what the value of PAJ would have been had the Court
used the same formula that Mr. Jackson used to purchase his shares in PAJ. The Court
was heavily influenced by this transaction..." Id. (emphasis added).
As part of PAJ's Motion to Amend Findings, Defendants directed the trial court
to undisputed evidence introduced at trial establishing that Jackson's 2001 buy-in was not
a cash sale but rather financed by non-interest bearing Promissory Notes. See Motion to
Amend Findings, Addendum Fy pg. 5-7; TR at 688 and 875.

27 See Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Insurance, 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983); See also
as cited above...Hogle v. Zinetics Medical, Inc., 63 P.3d 80, 86 (Utah 2002).
28 See Memorandum Decision, Addendum D, pg. 6; TR at 613.
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PAJ further pointed out that the only testimony the tri^l court heard regarding
present value of the notes was contained on Page 4 of Bowles' Expert Report which
reads:
On September 21, 2001, D. Scott Jackson purchased a one-third interest in
PAJ[PC] to be effective January 1, 2002 by executing three promissory notes to
the following individuals: Mr. Peterson, Mr. Allred, and to his parents.8 Based on
the principal payments specified in these notes, a present value date of January 1,
2002, and a discount (interest) rate of 8.0 percent, the present values of these three
notes were $41,743, $41,743, and $43,026, respectively, for a total purchase price
of $126,512. Per PAJ[PC]'s 2001 corporate tax return, gross receipts for 2001
were $752,562, which includes $31,942 from investment advisory services
included on schedule K. Therefore, Mr. Jackson paid approximately 17.0 percent
of revenue for his one-third interest, (emphasis added)

See Bowles Report, pg. 4, Trial Exhibit 91.
PAJ's motion also reminded the trial court that making a present value
adjustment for these payment terms is an essential component in properly calculating
Jackson's buy-in value and purchase price for his percentage in PAJ. PAJ's Motion then
illustrated three significant consequences stemming from this corrected formula:
1.

Once the present value of the non-interest baring notes is
calculated using the only evidence admitted at trial, the combined
total of the three notes executed by Jackson is reduced from
$206,850 to $126,063.

2.

The correct formula of Jackson's 2001 buy-in was not .90 times
earning, but rather .50.
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3.

The Correct value of Peterson's shares based upon the Jackson
buy-in is not $517,763, as the Court suggests, but rather
$287,646.21.

See Motion to Amend Findings, Addendum F, pg. 8; TR at 688 and 875.
In the trial court's subsequent Memorandum Decision dated July 20, 2009, the
trial court acknowledged "Mr. Jackson stated that an important component of this buy-in
transaction [2001] was the no interest notes that he was allowed to enter into." See
Memorandum Decision, pg. 2, Addendum By pg. 2; TR at 910. The trial court, however,
refused to correct its previous finding that the formula to value Jackson's 2001 buy-in in
its subsequent decision.
Rather than correcting the formula on which the court admittedly relied and
acknowledging the consequences that flow therefrom, the trial court sought to skirt the
issue by reasoning the 2001 buy-in formula did "not provide definitive valuation
guidance" nor was it the "sole means of determining value of Plaintiff s shares." Id. at 4
(emphasis added). The trial court reasoned" the Court does not feel it necessary to
amend any findings with regard to the 2001 buy-in formula, especially since the Court
ultimately did not rely on it when determining fair value of Plaintiffs." Id. at 5. The trial
court also asserted that "it was relying on a formula not the value derived from the
formula" and that the "0.9 formula" was "a simple" formula. Id.
The question is not whether the 2001 formula was the "definitive" or "sole" means
of valuation—rather whether the trial court considered it relevant in making its decision.
27

Since the trial court considered the 2001 formula relevant, PAJ maintains it was error for
the court not to correct the formula to show the present value of the 2001 transaction.
As to the first claim, PAJ submits the trial court cannot separate the formula from
the value of that formula. As to the second, the trial court cannot exchange simplicity for
accuracy. If the trial court is going to rely on a simple formula, the simple formula must
be accurate.
This Utah Supreme Court stated in Hogle that the determination of whether a
given fact or circumstance is relevant to fair value under state law is a question of law
reviewed de novo, "whether a given fact or circumstance is relevant of fair value is a
question of law" tried de novo. See Hogle v. Zinetics Medical Inc., 63 P.3d 80, 84 (Utah
2002).
The trial court acknowledged that the 2001 buy-in was something that heavily
influenced and was a guidepost to its decision. As such the trial court considered it to be
relevant regardless of whether it used it as its sole method of determining value. Thus,
the trial Court erred when it failed to correct a formula on which it expressly considered
relevant in valuing PAJ.
PAJ respectfully requests that this Court remand this case to the trial court to make
additional sufficient findings as to its valuation of PAJ as requested above and to correct
its mathematical error related to the Jackson 2001 buy-in as outlined herein.

CONCLUSION
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For the forgoing reasons, PAJ respectfully requests that this Court remand this
case to the trial court with instructions to make sufficient findings regarding the trial
court's calculation of the fair value of PAJ shares specifically addressing the
comparability, to PAJ, of the sample companies used in Townsend's market approach.
With further instructions: that fair value does not include personal goodwill of the
shareholders; that as a matter of law the undisputed non-solicitation clause does not
convert all shareholder personal goodwill to enterprise goodwill; to determine the fair
value of PAJ exclusive of shareholders personal goodwill; to correct the trial court's
mathematical error regarding the Jackson 2001 buy-in; and to conduct an evidentiary
hearing as may be necessary to enable the trial court to make such additional findings and
determinations.

DATED this ^

day of January, 2010.
HANCEY LAW OFFICES
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE

JACK W.PETERSON,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,

]
)

v.

]
]

D. SCOTT JACKSON, individually; and
ALAN D. ALLRED, individually; and on
behalf
of
PETERSON
ALLRED
JACKSON, P.C., a Utah Professional
Corporation

]
])
]
;)
]

JUDGMENT

Civil No. 060102504
Judge: Kevin Allen

Defendants and
Counterclaim Plaintiffs.

This matter having come for trial, without jury, on February 18, 19, and 20, 2009, before
Judge Kevin K. Allen, and the court thereafter having issued and entered its Decision in writing
on April 17,2009; which Decision includes specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as
particularly stated therein, and which pursuant to Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure constitute the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the
judgment herein; and,
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JACK W. PETERSON, v. D. SCOTT JACKSON, individually; and ALAN D. ALLRED, individually; and on
behalf of PETERSON ALLRED JACKSON, P.C., a Utah Professional Corporation
CIVIL NO. 06012504
Page 1 of 5

The court having entered Judgment herein on May 6,2009; and,
The court having entered its Memorandum Decision in writing dated July 20, 2009, after
having considered Defendants' postjudgment Motion to Amend Findings or Make Additional
Findings, Motion for Amendment of Judgment, Motion for Relief from Judgment, and Motion to
Stay, and also after having considered Plaintiffs postjudgment Motion to Partially Amend or
Alter Judgment, which Memorandum Decision includes specific Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law as particularly stated therein, and which pursuant to Rule 52 (a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure also constitute the court's additional findings of fact and conclusions of
law in support of the judgment herein; and the court havidg granted in part Defendants'
1 * MoT<*H To ST** **>J> *S T» £
postjudgment motions as toAmaking the additional and clarifying findings contained in said
Memorandum Decision of July 20, 2009, and otherwise having denied the aforesaid
postjudgment motions of the Defendants, and having granted in part and denied in part the
aforesaid postjudgment motion of Plaintiff as specifically stated in said Memorandum Decision
of July 20,2009; and,
Following an oral arguments hearing on July 2, 2009, and cause having been determined
by the court, and the court specifically having directed that a new judgment be prepared in
conformance with the Memorandum Decision of July 20, 2009; it is now therefore adjudged and
decreed as follows:
L

By way of declaratory judgment, Plaintiffs petition to dissolve Peterson Allred

Jackson, P.C. (hereinafter the "Corporation") is hereby dismissed;
2.

Defendant Peterson Allred Jackson, P.C., is awarded the right to purchase

Plaintiff Jack W. Peterson's 36.37% interest in the Corporation, which purchase shall be
deemed effective December 31,2006;
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3.

The Court has determined the fair value for the purchase of said shares of the

Corporation to be $454,170,06, representing the determined "fair value" of Plaintiffs
shares as of December 31, 2006 of $459,000.00, less the stipulated offset for Plaintiffs
USU earnings of $4,829.94 (hereinafter "Purchase Price");

4.

The Purchase Price is subject to interest as determined by the Court from

December 31,2006 until paid in full as more particularly described as follows:

a. $31,746.48 for the calendar year 2007 at 6.99% per annum;
b. $24,616.02 for the calendar year of 2008 at 5.42% per annum; and
c. $3,284.96 for the period of January 1, 2009 until April 20, 2009 at 2.40% per
annum; and,
d. $29.86 per day thereafter until paid in fill};

5.

By way of declaratory judgment, Plaintiff is not entitled to any distribution of

cash reserves held by the Corporation;

6.

By way of declaratory judgment, Plaintiff's investment practice belongs with

Plaintiff. As such, Plaintiff may retain the sum of $24,522.25 representing the passive
investment income from his investment practice received and held by Plaintiff since his
termination by Defendants;
7.

By way of declaratory judgment, the Defendants did not engage in oppressive

conduct or misapplication or wasting of assets. Therefore, attorney's fees and costs will
not be awarded;

8.

By way of declaratory judgment, Defendants are not entitled to damages under

their Counterclaim and it is dismissed; and
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9.

By way of declaratory judgment, the Purchase Price together with the accrued

interest shall be payable to the Plaintiff within ten days following the entry of Judgment
10.

Judgment is hereby awarded to Plaintiff against Defendants, jointly and

severally, for all amounts as due hereunder.

11.

The Defendants' Motion to Amend Findings or Make Additional Findings is

granted in part with respect to making the additional findings stated in the court's
Memorandum Decisioiyof July 20, 2009; said motion and Defendants' Motion Abr
Amendment of Judgmmt^Motion for Relief from Judgment, ai\d Motion to St&p are each
and all hereby otherwise denied.

12.

The Plaintiffs Motion to Partially Amend or Alter Judgment is granted with

regard to amendment of paragraphs 2 so as to correct Plaintiff's ownership interest to be
3637%, and with regard to amendment of paragraph 8 regarding the judgment that
Defendants' Counterclaim is dismissed. Said motion is otherwise denied
13.

The stay of judgment entered by the court on June 1,2009 is no longer in effect.

DATED THIS b

day of«*#,' 2009.
BY THE COURT:
e«vCv> A
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment was hand
delivered and also mailed postage prepaid by US Mail to counsel for Defendants, Mark Hancey,
Suite 200, 121 N. Springcreek Pkwy., Providence, Utah 84332, and to Gary N. Anderson and
Brian G. Cannell, 595 South Riverwoods Pkwy, Suite 100, Logan, Utah, on the 29th day of July,
2009.
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

Jack W. Peterson,
Plaintiff,
vs.
D. Scott Jackson, individually; Alan D.
Allred, individually and on behalf of
Peterson Allred Jackson, P.C, a Utah
Professional Corporation,

I
I
I

MEMORANDUM DECISION

I
I
I
I
I
I

Civil No. 06012504

Judge: Kevin K. Allen

Defendant and
I
Counterclaim Plaintiffs, I

THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Defendants' Motion to Amend
the Findings or Make Additional Findings under Utah R. Civ, P. 52(b), Motion for Amendment
ofJudgment under Utah R, Civ. P. 59(a), Motion for Relief from Judgment under Utah R. Civ. P.
60(a), (b)(1) and (b)(6), Motion to Stay under Utah R. Civ. P. 62(b), and Plaintiffs Motion to
Partially Amend or Alter Judgment under Utah R. Civ. P, 59(e) and 60. In preparation for its
decision, the Court has reviewed the parties' respective Motions and Memoranda, the respective
Opposition Memoranda, the respective Replies, each document submitted before the Court, and
the applicable case law and statutory provisions. Further, oral arguments were held on July 2,
2009. Having considered the forgoing, the Court issues this Memorandum Decision,
SUMMARY
A three-day trial was held to determine the "fair value" of Plaintiff s shares in Peterson,
Allred, Jackson, P.C. ("PAJ") as well as five other stipulated issues in dispute. During trial, both
parties submitted expert testimony as to the fair value of Mr. Peterson's shares. Plaintiffs expert
(hereinafter "Townsend") concluded that the fair value of Mr. Peterson's 36.37% interest in the
corporation entitled him to $459,000.00. Additionally, Townsend concluded Mr. Peterson was
entitled to $46,625.00 of undistributed cash, bringing the total to $505,625.00. In contrast,
1

Defendant's expert (hereinafter "Bowles") concluded that the fair value of Mr. Peterson's
36.37% interest in the corporation entitled him to $224,639.00. Both experts analyzed different
accounting methods to determine what the fair value of PAJ was. Townsend concluded that the
income approach, market approach, and general rule of thumb approach provided reasonable
indications of fair value and gave weights to each in coming to his final value. In contrast,
Bowles relied only on an asset approach, the excess earnings method, in deciding his final value.
Furthermore, the Court also heard testimony of historical transactions of PAJ's stock
namely: (1) Scott Jackson's 2001l buy-in and (2) the 2005 buy-sell agreement. Specifically, the
Court heard testimony from Mr. Peterson as to how the value of the shares was determined in
2001 when Mr. Jackson bought into thefirm.Mr. Peterson testified that the formula used to
value the shares was 90 percent of the total revenue of the company. Exhibit 83 contains
handwritten notes showing such formula, as well as showing that Mr. Jackson had already
obtained a 17.50 percent interest in the company, Exhibit 83 shows that the 90-percent-of-totalrevenue formula was only being applied to the remaining 15.83 percent of stocks that Mr.
Jackson needed to acquire to become a one-third owner. In regards to this buy-in formula, Mr.
Jackson testified in rebuttal by stating that he did not believe that any of them had any experience
in what they were doing at that time, Mr. Jackson testified that the most equitable tiling to.do was
to see what each finn's revenue was and merge them togetlier. Further, Mr. Jackson stated that an
important component of this buy-in transaction was the no interest notes he was allowed to enter
into. Also, fee Court received into evidence the 2005 buy-sell agreement (Ex. 70) and
Townsend's computation of PAJ's value as of December 31, 2006, using this buy-sell agreement
as a basis. {See Ex. 90 Sch. R.)
Townsend did not use either historical transaction in his final determination of the fair
value of PAJ. Townsend concluded that Mr. Jackson's 2001 buy-in did not provide "definitive
valuation guidance" because of the factors and terms of the agreement and, therefore, he did not
address how this transaction might affect fair value. (Ex. 90 p. 19.) Townsend examined the 2005

1

The Court will note that Mr. Jackson bought into fee firm on January 1, 2002, however
the parties have consistently referred to this transaction as the 2001 buy-in, so fee Court will do
the same.
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buy-sell agreement and determined that while it was "a good reasonableness check of value and
supports the values derived using the market approaches'* no weight was placed on this approach
in the final value weightings. (Id. at p. 28.)
Bowles also did not use either the 2001 buy-in or the 2005 buy-sell agreement in
determining the fair value of PAJ. Defendantsy expert summarily came up with a 2006 value of
PAJ based on Mr. Jackson's 2001 buy-in. (Ex. 91 p. 16.) However, Bowles dismissed the 2001
buy-in because it was five years old and because PAJ was a smaller company at the time. In
regards to the 2005 buy-sell agreement, Bowles stated that it "probably provides some indication
as to the value of PAJ." However, Bowles asserted that authors of the industry's standard guide
on business valuation methods have stated that a buy-sell agreement "should not necessarily be
used as a sole basis for determining value." (Ex. 90 p. 17.) Bowles dismissed using the buy-sell
agreement altogether.
After receiving the above testimony and evidence, the Court determined the fair value of
Mr. Peterson's 36.37% interest in the corporation entitled Mm to $459,000.00. (Decision p.7.)
The Court relied upon the Townsend's calculations in determining this value. The Court stated in
the Decision that it used Townsend's figure because "Plaintiffs expert's valuation used widely
accepted principles offinancialanalysis and valuation." (Id.) Further, the Court disregarded
Bowles's figure since it was based solely on an asset-based approach, which is the least reliable
method in valuing an ongoing, non asset driven company. (Id.) While the Court relied solely on
Townsend's valuation in coming to its final determination of fair value, the Court noted that it
viewed the 2001 buy-in transaction "as a guidepost in its decision." (Id.) The Court pointed out
that the value given by Townsend was "less than what the value of PAJ would have been had the
Court used the same formula that Mr. Jackson used to purchase his shares in PAJ." (Id.) Further,
the Court stated that it "was influenced heavily by [the 2001 buy-in transaction]; yet in the end
did not use it as the sole means to determine value...." (Id.)
The Court also noted that "[tjhere is no definitive procedure for [valuing a business] and
highly qualified experts offer vastly different opinions regarding determined value." (Id. at p. 4.)
The Court further noted that it refused to take a "Solomon approach" since doing so would
"require the Court to pick a number out of thin air." (Id.)
3

ANALYSIS
L

Defendant's Motion to Amend the Findings or Make Additional Findings
Under Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may amend its findings

or make additional findings upon motion by a party. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b). Questions of
sufficiency of evidence to support thefindingsmay be raised regardless of whether such was
raised during trial Id. However, a post judgment motion for reconsideration of a decision, once
rendered, is never appropriate under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Gillett v. Price, 2006
UT 26, % 6 (Utah 2006).
Defendants seek to amend thefindingsby correcting alleged mathematical errors in the
2001 buy-in, and also seek to have the Court reconsider its analysis by giving greater weight to
the 2001 buy-in. Defendants argue that because the computations were flawed in regards to this
buy-in, the Court's reliance on this transaction in valuing Plaintiffs shares was misplaced.
Therefore, Defendants argue, the Court should correct the computations, and select the valuation
method that most closely approximates Plaintiffs shares under such.
However, regardless of any alleged flaws, the Court never attributed such weight to the
2001 buy-in "number" as Defendants try to argue. In its Decision, the Court stated "Scott
Jacksons' buying into the firm did not provide definitive valuation guidance and therefore, the
Court will not apply this value calculation as the sole means of determining the value of
Plaintiffs shares." (Decision, p.7.) The Court specifically stated that it was not willing to take a
Solomon approach, as Defendants now seem to suggest the Court do. The Court pointed out that
the simple formula used for the 2001 buy-in lead to a higher amount than what Plaintiff was
asking for because it wanted to demonstrate to the Defendants how unfair their proposed value
was. The Court did not use it to choose the value in the middle or to justify Plaintiffs "number."
When the parties were dealing cordially with one another they came up with simple and
easy valuation formulas which all seemed to be based on approximately 90 percent of their
revenues. (See Ex. 70, Ex. 83, Ex. 90 Sch, R,, and Trial Testimony, Feb. 19-20, 2009.) While the
Court used the simple 2001 buy-in formula for ease in the Decision, the buy-sell agreements also
used an approximate 0.90 multiplier. (Ex. 90 Sch. R.) The Court was "influenced heavily"by this
4

since the parties were deciding for themselves what the fair value of their company was.
However, the Court does not have the expertise in valuing companies as do the parties' experts.
Because both experts rejected using these historical transactions, the Court did not feel
comfortable in using them either, although in theory it seemed to be fair. Therefore, the Court
chose not to use this method in deciding the fair value of PAJ and instead weighed the expert's
opinions.
Defendants are merely attempting to persuade this Court to reconsider the weight it
attributed to the 2001 buy-in. Regardless of how Defendants couch their argument, this the
Court cannot and will not do. See Gillett, 135 P,3d at f 6. Defendants, at trial, argued that
Townsend's calculations needed to be adjusted for present value, Plaintiff argued they did not.
The Court found Plaintiff and Plaintiff's expert more credible. Further, it was not the "number"
reached by the 2001 buy-in formula that influenced the Court as Defendant tries to argue. It was
the simple formula itself and the parties' seeming reliance on the 90 percent of revenue in the
buy-sell agreements. (See Ex. 70, Ex. 83, and Trial Testimony, Feb. 19-20,2009.) Therefore, die
Court does not feel it necessary to amend any "findings" with regard to the 2001 buy-in formula,
especially since the Court ultimately did not rely upon it when determining the fair value of
Plaintiffs shares.
Defendants also argue additionalfindingswere not made that are necessary to support the
Court's ultimate Decision. The Court was asked to determine the fair value of Plaintiff s shares
in PAJ. The Court found the fair value to be $459,000.00. Ultimately the Court found Plaintiffs
expert more convincing because he used "widely accepted principles of financial analysis . . .
[and] addressed the tliree most recognized valuation methods that the Supreme Court of Utah has
relied o n . , . [rather than] only the asset based approach." (Decision, p. 7.)
The Court is only required to makefindingson the material issues; it is not necessary to
resolve all conflicting evidentiary issues. In Re Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238, 1248 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989). However, the Court will make the following additional findings to ensure its
Decision is sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps on which this ultimate conclusion was
reached. See Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1995).
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1)

Townsend's exclusion of any personal goodwill deduction was appropriate where
that expert gave considerable weight to Plaintiffs employment contract, and
opined that such constructively affixed any of Plaintiff s personal goodwill with
PAJ as an enterprise. {See Trial Testimony, Feb. 18,2009). As Townsend
testified, where personal goodwill has become transferable, it is no longer
personal. {See Trial Testimony, Feb. 18,2009.) Further, how Bowles extrapolated
personal goodwill in his calculations was in error and excluded die benefit of the
bargain. {Id)

2)

Townsend's determination of "reasonable compensation to the shareholders" was
appropriate insofar as it was based on a comprehensive, independent, third-party
study. {See Ex. 90. Sch. E, Robert Half International 2007 Salary Guide; see also
Trial Testimony, Feb. 18,2009.) Such cannot be said of Defendants' expert's
analysis. {See Ex. 90, p. 8) (Bowles interviewed four Utah CPAs in medium-sized
firms to determine what they paid senior managers.). Further, contrary to
Defendants' assertion, Townsend only provided one value for "reasonable
compensation to the shareholders," where any additional values were mere
extrapolations by Defendants. {See Trial Testimony, Feb. 18, 2009.)

3)

Townsend's market analysis data was comparable to and appropriately considered
in the valuation of PAJ, as shown by a high correlation to PAJ of 0.92. {See id)
Townsend testified that such a high con-elation was rare and therefore determined
the market approach to be very appealing in determining value for this particular
company. {See id)

4)

Townsend's analysis of Seller's Discretionary Earnings, even with any deviation
from the general definition, was appropriate given the task was to value the entire
PAJ enterprise. {See id)

5)

As to the exclusion of Plaintiff s investment practice income, the Court finds such
has no material effect on the fair value of PAJ. The investment income included
by Townsend was appropriate where Plaintiffs investment income prior to being
tenninated was paid to PAJ pursuant to the rental agreement and therefore, had
6

value to the company as such,
Therefore, the Motion to Amend Findings or Malce Additional Findings is granted with
respect to making additional findings by incorporating the above findings into the Court's
Decision. However, the Motion is denied with respect to amending any findings with respect to
the 2001 buy-in formula.
II.

Defendants' Motion for Amendment of Judgment
Under Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, there are seven grounds on which

Defendants could amend the Judgment. These include: irregularity in the proceedings,
misconduct of the jury, accident or surprise, newly discovered evidence, influence of passion or
prejudice, insufficiency of evidence to justify the verdict, and error in the law. Id. While
Defendants' original Memorandum made a blanket argument under Rule 59(a), in their Reply
Memorandum they argued the relief sought is only under Rule 59(a)(6) and (7). Therefore, the
Court will address only these two grounds.
A party slanting already available evidence in its favor will not meet the party's burden of
showing an insufficiency of the evidence. See Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425 (Utah 1998). The
Court's judgment was that the fair value of Plaintiff s shares was $459,000.00. This was
supported by Townsend's Expert Report as well as Townsend's testimony at trial. Defendants'
attack on the alleged mathematical errors in the 2001 buy-in formula is inconsequential when the
Court did not make its judgment based on that formula. Townsend analyzed all three methods of
valuation in his report. {See Ex, 90.) Townsend testified that he felt that he needed to use more
methods because of the nuances of a professional business, (Trial Testimony, February 18,2009.)
Townsend testified that what really drove value in this company was income, however, the
market approach method was very appealing because of the very high correlations. (Id.)
Townsend therefore assigned weights to the income approach, market approach, and general
rule-cf-thumb approaches to determine a fair value. (Ex. 90.) Defendant's expert, on the other
hand, chose only to use the excess earnings approach, which is an asset method. (Ex. 91.) The
Utah Court of Appeals has found that the asset-based methods are the least reliable when looking
at a company that is not being liquidated. Bingham Consolidation Co. v. Groesbeck, 2004 UT
7

App. 434, f 19 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). Therefore, the Court finds that there was sufficient
evidence to base to follow Plaintiffs expert in deciding what fair value was.
Further, there was no error in the law when the Court chose to follow Plaintiffs expert.
There is no fixed method for valuation. See Bingham Consolidation, 2004 UT App. 434, % 18
(holding all generally accepted techniques of valuation used in diefinancialcommunity may be
considered). However, "the three most recognized and relevant elements of fair value for stock
valuation purposes are asset value, market value, and investment value. Hogle v, Zinetics Med,
Inc., 2002 UT 121 % 18 (Utah 2002). The Hogle court held that all three values should be
considered even though they may not influence the result in every valuation. Id. It was
Defendants' expert who testified that only the asset method should be used, the very method that
is least reliable where PAJ is not being liquidated. See Bingham Consolidation, 2004 UT App.
434, % 19. In contrast, it was Plaintiffs expert who analyzed all three methods of valuation, and
detennined that the asset value was inapplicable, while the market and investment/income values
were highly relevant. Therefore, the Court did not commit an error in the law by following
Plaintiffs expert. See Jensen v. Logan City, 88 P.2d 459 (Utah 1939) (holding it is the court's
duty to weigh the credibility of witnesses, and accept or reject such evidence).
III.

Defendants' Motion for Relief from Judgment
Under Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for relief from judgment is

only granted where there is a clerical mistake, mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly
discovered evidence or any other reason justifying relief. Utah R. Civ. P. 60. Again, Defendants
make blanket arguments under this rule based on the alleged mathematical errors of the 2001
buy-in. However, in the Reply Memorandum Defendants argue specifically that the Court
committed a clerical mistake in calculating Scott Jackson's buy-in, and that the Court was thus
mistakenly induced to follow Plaintiffs expert witness.
Townsend's expert report as well as his testimony as to the 2005 buy-sell agreement set
forth the same general 90 percent multiplier. However, accepting arguendo that the 2001 buy-in
computations must be corrected for present value, the Court still made clear that the 2001 buy-in
was not dispositive, and that Defendants' expert was unconvincing for wholly separate reasons.
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(See Decision.) Therefore, to repair the alleged clerical mistake for the reasons posited by
Defendants would place more emphasis on the 2001 buy-in than was ever intended by the Court.
See Stranger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins\ Co.,669 P.2d 1201,1206 (Utah 1983) (clerical mistakes
are corrected in the interest of having the judgment reflect what was intended). As noted, the
Court never intended for the "number" arrived at by using the 2001 buy-in formula to be a factor
in determining the fair value of Plaintiff s shares. The Court will not now change those
intentions. See Gillett, 135 P.3d at <[| 6.
Further, the Court does not find that there was any other mistake, inadvertence,
excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence or any other reason that would justify relieving
Defendants from this judgment. As noted, the Court's judgment was that the fair value of
Plaintiffs shares is $459,000,00. This was based on the testimony and evidence presented by
Plaintiffs expert. The Court was aware of all the factors that Defendants argue must be viewed
in regards to the 2001 buy-in. Defendants have not presented any new evidence. The Court
specifically held that it would not apply the 2001 buy-in because both experts dismissed using it.
Therefore, there has been no mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect when the Court's
judgment was based on the Plaintiffs expert and not the 2001 buy-in.
Further, Defendants have not set forth any other reason that would justify relieving them
from this judgment. Defendants are merely trying to persuade the Court to reconsider the
judgment by disregarding Plaintiffs expert and to rely solely on a i^ethod that their own expert
dismissed. Defendants* expert rejected the value he arrived at by using the 2001 buy-in, even
when adjusting it for present value and adjusting for personal goodwill. The Court is not going to
change the judgment to choose a value based on a method that both experts dismissed for being
inappropriate. The Court found that the parties had continuously used an approximate 90 percent
of revenue multiplier when valuing their company, however, both experts stated that these
transactions were unfitting for use in determining a fair value of PAJ. Therefore, the Court relied
on the expert opinions and rejected using the 2001 buy-in formula altogether. Consequently,
Defendants have not set forth any reason for why the Court's reliance on Plaintiffs expert was in
error.
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IV.

Defendants> Motion to Stay
The Court previously granted this Motion since under Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Gerber,

when a motion for amendment of thefindingshas been timely made and served upon all parties,
such invokes a continuation of jurisdiction and suspends the finality of the judgment until the
motion is ruled upon. 526 P.2d 1121,1124, n.3 (Utah 1974). However, the Court has now ruled
on Defendants' Motion to Amend the Findings or Make Additional Findings and, therefore, the
stay is no longer in effect.
V.

Plaintiffs Motion to Partially Amend or Alter Judgment
Plaintiff2, moves the Court to amend four separate paragraphs of the Judgment. The Court

will address each paragraph separately.
Paragraph 1:
New language emphasizing Defendants* obligation to pay the final purchase price is
unnecessary, as such is already made clear by paragraph nine of the Judgment. {See Judgment, f
9). Additionally, all that Utah Code § 16-10a-1434(6) requires of the Court is to order a
dismissal, and any additional quotation of fee statute is superfluous. The statute controls and as
such, there is no need to add the statutoiy language to the Judgment. Finally, even accepting
Defendants' argument feat Plaintiffs new language eliminates the requirement for Jackson's and
Allred's joint and several liability, such is not what the Court or parties have intended.
Paragraph ten of the Judgment makes clear that liability is to be had jointly and severally. (See
Judgment, ^ 10.) Additionally, the parties stipulated to joint and several liability during the May
5, 2009 Objection Hearing. Therefore, as to amending paragi'aph one of the Judgment, Plaintiff's
motion is denied.
Paragraph 2;
The misstated interest of 36.67% is a clerical error, mechanical in nature where correction
requires no legal analysis. See Stranger, 669 P,2d at 1206. Therefore, Plaintiffs motion is
granted so the Judgment reflects Jack Peterson has a 36.37% interest in PAJ.
The omission of the purchase being "deemed effective December 31, 2006" is denied.
Plaintiffs argument that only the right to purchase was had on December 31, 2006, is contrary to
10

the language of Utah Code § 16-10(a)-1434. The Court was to determine the fair value of Jack
Peterson's interest in PAJ from either the day before the petition wasfiled,or the date the Court
determined appropriate, See Utah Code § 16-lG(a)-1434(4). The Court determined the
appropriate date of valuation was December 31,2006. {See Court Order, September 11, 2007.)
However, because the valuation date and the fair value are rarely determined simultaneously,
interest may be allowed "from the date determined by the court to be equitable." Utah Code §1610(a)-1434(5)(c). Thus by allowing interest, the statute makes clear that the valuation date not
only signifies a right to purchase, but also signifies the effective purchase date. The Court
properly interpreted it as such, and allotted interest from December 31,2006. {See Judgment, ^

Lastly, the additional language directing Defendants to pay the Plaintiff is denied. The
same is already had through paragraph nine of the Judgment {See Judgment, May 6,2009.)
Paragraph 3:
There is no mistake, clerical or otherwise, contained in this paragraph. The words of the
Judgment make clear what constitutes thefinalPurchase Price. {See Judgment, f 3.) Mere
semantics are an inappropriate basis for amending the Judgment, at least insofar as such were
already agreed to during the May 5,2009, Objection Healing.
Paragraph 8:
Defendants* argument that Utah Code Section 16-10a-1434 makes no requirement to
dismiss a claim for damages is irrelevant. The Counterclaim was not based on that statute, but
rather on a covenant not to compete. Any legal analysis required, namely that Defendants are not
entitled to damages, has already taken place. {See Judgment, % 8.) Dismissal follows as an
automatic operation of law. Therefore, Plaintiffs amendment is rqerely mechanical in nature,
and failure to dismiss the Counterclaim was a clerical error under Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Stranger, 669 P.2d at 1206. Therefore, as to amending paragraph eight of
the Judgment, Plaintiffs motion is granted
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' Motion to Amend the Findings or Make Additional
11

Findings is granted in part as to the additional findings and denied as consistent herewith.
Defendants' Motion for Amendment ofJudgment and Motion for Relief from Judgment are
denied. Plaintiffs Motion to Partially Amend or Alter Judgment is denied, except as to the
clerical errors in paragraphs two and eight of the Judgment
The stay of judgment is no longer in effect. Counsel for Plaintiff is directed to prepare a
new Judgment in conformance herewith.
Dated this 2 0 day of July, 2009.
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JUDGMENT

Civil No. 06012504
Judge: Kevin Allen

Defendants and
Counterclaim Plaintiffs,

This matter having come for trial, without jury, on February 18,19, and 20, 2009, before
Judge Kevin K. Allen, and the court thereafter having issued and entered its Decision in writing
on April 17,2009; which Decision includes specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as
particularly stated therein, and which pursuant to Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure constitute the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the
judgment herein; and

JUDGMENT
JACK W. PETERSON, v. D. SCOTT JACKSON, individually; and ALAN D. ALLRED, individually; and on
behalf ofPETERSON ALLRED JACKSON, P.C., a Utah Professional Corporation
CIVIL NO. 06012504
Page 1 of 4

Following hearing on May 5,2009 and good cause having been determined by the court,
it is now therefore adjudged and decreed as follows:
1.

By way of declaratory judgment, Plaintiffs petition to dissolve Peterson Allred

Jackson, P.C> (hereinafter the "Corporation") is hereby dismissed;
2.

Defendant Peterson Allred Jackson, P-C, is awarded the right to purchase

Plaintiff Jack W. Peterson's 36.67% interest in the Corporation, which purchase shall be
deemed effective December 31,2006;
3.

The Court has determined the fair value for the purchase of said shares of the

Corporation to be $454,170.06, representing the determined "fair value" of Plaintiffs
shares as of December 31, 2006 of $459,000.00, less the stipulated offset for Plaintiffs
USU earnings of $4,829.94 (hereinafter "Purchase Price");
4.

The Purchase Price is subject to interest as determined by the Court from

December 31,2006 until paid in full as more particularly described as follows;
a. $31,746.48 for the calendar year 2007 at 6.99% per annum;
b. $24,616.02 for the calendar year of 2008 at 5.42% per annum; and
c. $3,284.96 for the pexiod of January 1, 2009 until April 20, 2009 at 2.40% per
annum; and,
d. $29.86 per day thereafter until paid in full;
5.

By way of declaratory judgment, Plaintiff is not entitled to any distribution of

cash reserves up to December 31,2006 held by the Corporation;
6.

By way of declaratory judgment, Plaintiffs investment practice belongs with

Plaintiff, As such, Plaintiff may retain the sum of $24,522.25 representing the passive

JUDGMENT
JACK W. PETERSON, v. D. SCOTT JACKSON, individually; and ALAN D. ALLRED, individuaUy; and on
behalf of PETERSON ALLRED JACKSON, P.G, a Utah Professional Corporation
CIVIL NO. 06012504
Page 2 of4

investment incomefromhis investment practice received and held by Plaintiff since his
termination by Defendants;
7.

By way of declaratory judgment, the Defendants did not engage in oppressive

conduct or misapplication or wasting of assets. Therefore, attorney's fees and costs will
not be awarded;
8.

By way of declaratory judgment, Defendants are not entitled to damages under

their Counterclaim; and
9*

By way of declaratory judgment, the Purchase Price together with the accrued

interest shall be payable to the Plaintiff within ten days following the entry of Judgment
10.

Judgment is hereby awarded to Plaintiff against Defendants, jointly and

severally, for all amounts as due hereunder.

DATED THIS j$_ day of May, 2009.
BY TH^ COURT:

W&MnlC After?
Kevin K. Allen, District Court Judge
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I hereby certify that on this Jyf day of May, 2009,1 caused to be hand-delivered a true
and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT, to the following:
Mark Hancey
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marlc@Jbancey.com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE

JACK W. PETERSON,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,
v.

)

D. SCOTT JACKSON, individually; and ALAN
D. ALLRED, individually; and on behalf of
PETERSON ALLRED JACKSON, P.C., a Utah
Professional Corporation

)
)
)
)

Defendants and Counterclaim
Plaintiffs.

DECISION

Civil No. 06012504
Judge: Kevin K. Allen

)
)

THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to the trial held on this matter on
February 18, 19, and 20, 2009. Additionally, the Court and the Parties met April 16, 2009 to
consider and review final arguments. A Stipulated Pretrial Order was entered into by the parties.
The parties stipulated that the Defendants would pay the amount, which the court after trial
adjudicates to be owing to the Plaintiff, within ten (10) business days following the entry of
judgment. The parties stipulated to a Statement of Undisputed Facts, listed below. Further, the
parties stipulated to the six issues of dispute that needed resolution by the Court. Finally, the
parties stipulated to bifurcate the issue of costs and fees, if any, should the Court determine that
they are warranted in this case. Having considered the foregoing, tfye Court issues this
Memorandum Decision.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint on November 2, 2006 seeking, among other

claims, dissolution of the corporation.
2.

Plaintiff also sought a Temporary Restraining Order preventing a Special

Shareholders' Meeting which was scheduled by Defendants to discuss and approve changes to
PAJ Bylaws.
1

3.

The Court denied Plaintiffs motion after a hearing on November 4, 2006.

4.

Plaintiff filed a second motion for injunctive relief herein on January 19.2007.

5.

After hearing the court issued a memorandum decision dated January 26, 2007

denying such motion.
6.

Defendants acknowledged that the Corporation must be dissolved and elected

under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1434 to purchase Plaintiffs shares in lieu of dissolution for their
"fair value". See Election dated November 6,2006.
7.

Plaintiff owns 36.37% of the Corporation. Defendants Allred and Jackson

collectively own the remaining 63.63%.
8.

The parties were unable to reach an agreement as to the fair value of Plaintiffs

shares under the procedures of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1434(3).
9.

Pursuant to order of this court, the parties have caused to be prepared and

simultaneously filed expert valuation reports asserting the fair value of Plaintiffs shares to be
paid to Plaintiff under Defendant's election. This court has set the valuation date of the shares as
ofDecember31,2006.
10. Plaintiffs expert witness, R. Brad Townsend, in his valuation report asserted that
the fair value of Plaintiff s 36.37% in Peterson Allred Jackson, PC, as of December 31, 2006,
equals $459,000.00.

Townsend further concluded Plaintiff was entitled to 36.37% of the

$128,196.00 undistributed cash as of December 31, 2006, equaling $46,625.00.
11. In total, Townsend asserts Plaintiff is entitled to $505,625.00.
12. Defendant's expert witness, Tyler J. Bowles, in his valuation report asserted that
the fair value of Plaintiffs 36.37% in Peterson Allred Jackson, PC, as of December 31, 2006,
equals $224,639.00.
13.

Defendants have continued to operate the corporation under the name of

"Peterson Allred Jackson".
14. Defendants have continued to operate at the same location in North Logan, as a
tenant under the terms of a 10 year lease executed in 2004.
2

15. Plaintiffs counsel holds in trust the sum of $6,692.49 representing deposits of
payments to Plaintiff from American Underwriters Life Insurance Company and Western United
Life Assurance Co. Inc. from 12/14/06 until 1/12/09.
16. Plaintiff has received direct deposits from Cambridge Investment Research Inc. as
residual commissions of $17,829.96 from 11/30/06 until 3/14/08. Those funds are held in a
dedicated account with Zions First National Bank.
17. For approximately 20 years prior to this lawsuit, Plaintiff has been an adjunct
instructor of accounting at Utah State University (USU). Plaintiffs gross monthly salary from
USU was $1,523.83 (1,092.78 after tax) in December 2006. For the times relevant to this action
Plaintiffs salary at PAJ has been reduced by the gross compensation he has earned at USU. In
January 2007, Plaintiff received an additional payment of $6,000.00 ($4,829.94 after tax) from
USU for services rendered during the fall semester of 2006.
18. For times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and Dennis Jackson each held securities
licenses. Dennis Jackson and Jack Peterson have for several years provided financial investment
services as licensed registered securities representatives for various 0lients.
19. Securities regulations require all commissions be paid directly to the registered
representative of the investment client. Dennis Jackson and Jack Peterson received such
commissions as 1099 income from the registered broker. After receiving commissions each paid
to PAJ and amount equal to such commissions as rent.
20. The files for investment clients were maintained at the offices of PAJ and
authorized staff assisted in servicing the clients under the direction of the registered
representative.
21.

Cambridge Investment Research, Inc. was Jack Peterson's broker. Beacon

Financial Planning, LLC was Dennis Jackson's broker.
22. After Peterson's termination of employment, Peterson spoke on occasion with
agents of Cambridge.
23.

Cambridge sent two separate letters dated November 1, 2007 and November 12,
3

2007.

24. On June 4, 2007, PAJ gave Peterson notice of intent to sell shares of PAJ to
Dianna Cannell and Kelly Wilson. Peterson objected to such sale.
STIPULATED ISSUES OF DISPUTE
1.

What is the "fair value" of Plaintiffs shares in Peterson Allred Jackson, P.C. to be paid
by Defendants to Plaintiff because of their election to purchase his shares in lieu of
dissolution?

2.

Was the investment practice of Plaintiff his property or an asset of the corporation?

3.

Whether Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest relating back to December 31, 2006,
the judicially determined effective date for fair value; and if so, what is the amount of
interest?

4.

Whether Defendants engaged in oppressive conduct or misapplication or wasting of
assets as specified under Utah Code 16-10a-1430 (2), and if so, should the court under
16-10a-1434(5)(d) in its discretion award Plaintiff reasonable attorney fees and costs?

5.

What, if any, are Defendants' credits and off-sets against Plaintiffs claims?

6.

Are Defendants' entitled to any damages under their counterclaim?
DISCUSSION and FINDINGS

1.

What is the "fair value" of Plaintiffs shares in Peterson Allred Jackson, P.C to be
paid by Defendants to Plaintiff because of their election to purchase his shares in lieu
of dissolution?
Valuing a business is always a difficult undertaking for the Court. There is no definitive

procedure for so doing and highly qualified experts offer vastly different opinions regarding
determined value. A perfect example is this case. The Court heard two different opinions
regarding the value of Peterson Allred Jackson, P.C. (hereinafter PAJ) from two very qualified
individuals. Yet in the end there was over a 50% difference in value between the two. The
natural inclination is to take a Solomon approach and split the difference. However, the Court
has not done this. To do so would negate both expert opinions and require the Court to pick a
4

number out of thin air. The Court has weighed carefully Utah law and the different experts5
approaches to determining value, along with the testimony and evidence presented at trial, and
finds tlie following:
Utah Code Annotated Section 16-10a-1434(1) provides that in a dissolution proceeding,
the corporation or its shareholders may elect to purchase all shares of the corporation owned by
the petitioning shareholder, at tlie "fair value" of tlie shares. If the parties cannot come to an
agreement as to the fair value of the shares, the court shall "determine the fair value of the
petitioning shareholder's shares as of the . . . date the court determines to be appropriate under
the circumstances and based on the factors the court determines to be appropriate," Utah Code
Ann. § 16-10A-1434(4). The Court has established tlie valuation date to be December 31, 2006.
Section 1434 does not define fair value and there are no fixed methods for valuating
shares. However, "[m]ost courts permit "all generally accepted techniques of valuation used in
the financial community."" Bingham Consolidation Co. v. Groesbeck, 2004 UT App 434, fl8
(Utah Ct. App. 2004) citing Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp,, 747 A.2d 549, 556 (Del. 2000). The
fair value of shares under this statute has not been interpreted in a reported decision in the State
of Utah. However, the Supreme Court of Utah addressed the determination of the fair value of a
dissenting minority shareholder's stock in Oabidge Energy, Inc. v. Clifton, 937 P.2d 130 (Utah
1997) and Hogle v. Zinetics Med., Inc., 2002 UT 121 (Utah 20q2). The Utah Supreme Court
noted in Oabidge and reiterated in Hogle, that "the three most recognized and relevant elements
of fair value for stock valuation purposes are asset value, market value, and investment value.'5
Hogfe, 2002 UT 121118.
Unless a corporation is being liquidated, "the value of a corporation's assets "is the least
reliable of the three factors in value determination" because it provides "little indication of what
people will pay for the shares.'"' Bingham Consolidation, 2004 UT App 434, ^[19 citing
Oabidge, 937 P.2d at 133. Additionally, the investment value approach has been traditionally
favored by courts. Oabidge, 937 P.2d at 133.
In the present case, the Defendant's expert has made his recommendation as to the fair
value of Plaintiff s shares based on an asset based approach of valuation, specifically the excess
5

earnings method. Defendant's expert asserts the fair value of Plaintiffs 36.37% in PA J. as of
December 31, 2006, equals $224,639.00. However, PAJ is not being liquidated, therefore,
according to Bingham, the asset based approach is the least reliable of the valuation methods.
Further, in Defendant's valuation report, the expert states that "p]t is my understanding that Utah
case law supports a fair value concept in which the ownership interest is valued in the hands of a
specific'owner or buyer." Ex. 91 p. 2. The expert then cites the Hogle case for this proposition.
However, the Court in Hogle held, ""fair value" is not measured by any unique benefits that will
accrue to the acquiring corporation, any more than the compensable value of property taken by
eminent domain is measured by its special value to the condemnor." Hogle, 2002 UT 121 ^f 17
quoting Oafoidge, 937 P.2d at 134.
On the other hand, the Plaintiffs expert considered all three valuation techniques
mentioned in Hogle and subsequently applied a percentage weight to each of the elements of
value. Although there was never an established method in determining the percentage weight of
each value, Plaintiffs expert did offer a reasonable and educated explanation for making the
assumptions he did. Plaintiffs expert witness asserts that the fair value of Plaintiff s 36.37% in
PAJ, as of December 31, 2006, equals $459,000.00. Further, Plaintiffs expert also states that
Plaintiff was entitled to 36.37% of the $128,196.00 undistributed cash as of December 31, 2006,
equaling $46,625.00. Therefore, in total, Plaintiffs expert asserts Plaintiff is owed $505,625.00.
The court also heard evidence that Scott Jackson bought into the firm on or about January
1, 2002. Scott Jackson bought his shares using a value calculation of the gross sales times 0.9,
times the percentage of stock (i.e., $750,000 * .9 * 15.83% = $106,852.50). See Ex. 83. Applying
this formula to the Plaintiffs shares would result in his shares being worth SSwJuS.H. 1
Defendants argued that this was an inaccurate measure for two reasons. First, PAJ is not the
same firm it was in 2002. There had been substantial growth since that time; and it was argued
that the growth was primarily attributable to Mr. Jackson's efforts to expand the firm. It was
argued that given the gross sales of the firm at the applicable time, Mr. Jackson would have
1

This figure resulted from using Defendant's expert's total revenue of Peterson Allred
Jackson from 2006 of $1,581,77.33. See Ex. 91 p. 3. It will be noted that Plaintiffs expert has a
total revenue figure of approximately $1,720,563. See Ex. 90 Schedule A.
6

never used that formula to determine value because it would have resulted in a value that did not
coincide with a reasonable return on such an investment. Second, it was argued that the Parties
did not know what they were doing, having had little experience in these matters and that the
method used in 2002 resulted in an overvaluation of the firm.
The first argument has merit; the second argument is silly. That Mr. Jackson bought into
a firm that has since grown and expanded is already an established fact. There was little
testimony to contradict that much of the growth in the firm since Mr. Jackson joined the firm
could be attributed to him. However, it could also be argued that without the opportunity to grow
such an established firm as Peterson, Allred, Mr. Jackson's shares would not have much value.
To say that Certified Public Accountants with the experience and education of the parties
in this case did not know what they were doing when evaluating the firms worth contradicts their
very purpose as CPA's. Of course these parties Icnew what they were doing. The fact that one or
both or all later regretted the valuation method or terms of Mr. Jackson's purchase of shares in
the firm does not mean that this valuation method does not have merit. The Court recognizes
that Plaintiffs expert stated that Scott Jackson's buying into the fipn did not provide definitive
valuation guidance and therefore, the Court will not apply this value calculation as the sole
means of determining the value of the Plaintiffs shares; however, the Court does view this
transaction between Mr. Jackson and then Peterson, Allred as a guidepost in its decision.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the fair value of Plaintiff s shares in PAJ is
$459,000.00. Plaintiffs expert's valuation used widely accepted principles of financial analysis
and valuation. Further, the Plaintiffs expert's valuation has addressed the three most recognized
valuation methods that the Supreme Court of Utah have relied on in dissenter shares valuation
cases whereas Defendant's expert used only the asset based approach which has been determined
as the least reliable in a non-asset driven company.
The Court points out that this determined value is less than what the value of PAJ would
have been had the Court used the same formula that Mr Jackson used to purchase his shares in
PAJ The Court was influenced heavily by this transaction; yet, in the end did not use it as the
sole means to determine value because 1) Plaintiffs expert's opinion was that it did not provide
7

definitive valuation guidance and 2) Defendant's arguments that the firm is a different firm than
it was in 2002 has merit. The Court did not have enough evidence to separate the increased
value that Mr. Jackson brought to the firm and the Parties did not agree as to how that increased
value would be treated, leaving the Court to only view PAJ's value in its entirety.
The Court heard evidence that at the end of every year most of the excess cash was
distributed to the partners which would leave very little cash reserves in the following months.
Plaintiff was fired in the fail and subsequently no cash was distributed. The Court finds for
reasons stated hereinafter that the controlling partners in PAJ had the prerogative to manage the
firm as they saw fit, to include increasing cash reserves. Plaintiffs expert reduced cash in the
adjusted balance sheet approach so as to avoid double counting excess cash in its valuation
report. See Ex. 90, p. 27. Unfortunately, the Court could not find nor determine what the
Plaintiffs expert's subsequent value would be had the excess cash been included and the Court
was not willing to speculate. Therefore, the court finds that the Defendants had the right to
change business practices by keeping excess cash as reserves instead of distributing it and that
Plaintiff was not entitled to any distribution thereof. Additionally, Defendants have maintained
this cash reserve practice since Plaintiff was fired.
2

Was the investment practice of Plaintiff his property or an asset of the corporation?
Plaintiff operated an investment practice while employed by PAJ.

The broker

association, contracts and licensing were held by the Plaintiff personally, PAJ was not licensed to
practice or advise or sell securities. Plaintiff received all income and reported such on a form
1099. Plaintiff paid PAJ rent in an amount equal to Plaintiffs commissions and receipts from
this investment practice. This arrangement was done as consideration for the time and expenses
incurred by Plaintiff in the operation of this investment practice.
When Plaintiff was fired, he no longer had an obligation to pay rent equal to his
commission and receipts, primarily because PAJ was no longer providing any support for
Plaintiffs investment practice. It is clear that the securities license belonged to the Plaintiff. This
begs the question of which comes first, the investment practice or the licenses and which has the
value? The Court views the securities license much like a college degree or certification from
the state as a CPA. It runs with the person, not the entity. While the court would agree that the
8

investment practice was a part of PAJ, it was only under the conditions that all commissions and
rent be passed through to the corporation in exchange for the support of the corporation. When
Plaintiff was terminated, neither side had any obligation to the other regarding income, or
support. Certainly, the Parties did not contemplate that Plaintiff would surrender his securities
license and all that comes with it by being terminated against his will. As such, Plaintiffs
investment practice belonged to him.
3.

Whether Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest relating back to December 31,
2006, the judicially determined effective date for fair value; and if so, what is the
amount of interest?
Utali Code Annotated Section 16-10a-1434(5)(c) provides, "[i]nterest may be allowed at

the rate and from the date determined by the court to be equitable." Utali Code Ann. §16-10a1434(5)(c). Plaintiff argues that the Utah legislature has given direction as to the rate of
prejudgment interest in dissolving shareholder disputes under the Utali Business Code. Section
16-10a-1301(5) defines "interest" as "interest from the effective date of the corporate action until
the date of payment, at the statutory rate set forth in Section 15-1-1, compounded annually."
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1301(5).
Utah Code 15-1-1 states in pertinent part that "[ujnless parties to a lawful contract specify
a different rate of interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money,
goods, or chose hi action shall be 10% per annum." Utah Code Attn. § 15-1-1(2). Defendants on
or about November 6. 2006 elected to purchase Plaintiffs shares of the corporation pursuant to
Utali Code Section 16-10a-1434. The Defendants obligated themselves to pay the fair share of
Plaintiffs shares at that time. Therefore, Plaintiff argues that the Court should order interest at
the rate of 10% per annum.
Defendants argue that no or very little interest should be owing to Plaintiff because
keeping his money in PAJ "is about the best place Peterson could have his money," See Post
Trial Mem., p. 7. This argument ignores the time honored principle that one should be able to
chose what to do with their money. There are many tilings Plaintiff could have been doing with
the value of his shares, all of which are his right as the owner of such assets. The Court also
notes that Plaintiff was fired and thus during this time had to support himself through means
9

other tlaan operating an accounting firm he started in 1984. In addition, Defendants have had use
of said funds for over two years.
The Defendants have failed to make any payments to the Plaintiff for his value of the
shares they electee! to purchase on November 6,2006.
Where the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a
particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and figures, interest should
be allowed from that time and not from the date of judgment. On the other hand,
where damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated with mathematical
accuracy, such as in the case of personal injury, wrongful death, defamation of
character, false imprisonment, etc., the amount of the damages must be
ascertained and assessed by the trier of the fact at the trial, and in such cases
prejudgment interest is not allowed.
Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414,422 (Utah 1989).
Damages in this matter have previously been determined to be from December 31, 2006.
Also, the valuation of Plaintiff's shares can be measured by facts and figures to a mathematical
certainty. Therefore, it is equitable to award the Plaintiff prejudgment interest. The Court finds
guidance in the Post Judgment Interest Rates set by the State of Utah. These rates are based on a
variety of economic indicators and generally reflect a fair interest rate, absent an agreement
otherwise. The Post Judgment Interest Rates for the years in which this amount is due are as
follows: 2007 - 6.99%; 2008 - 5.42%; 2009 - 2.40%. The Court orders that these rates will
apply for the applicable time period in which Plaintiff was entitled to judgment.
4.

Whether Defendants engaged in oppressive conduct or misapplication or wasting of
assets as specified under Utah Code 16-10a-1430 (2), and if so, should the court under
16-10a-l 434(5) (d) in its discretion award Plaintiff reasonable attorney fees and costs?
Utah Code Annotated Section 16-10a-1434(5)(d) provides that "[i]f the court finds that

the petitioning shareholder had probable grounds for relief under Subsection 16-10a-143 0(2)(b)
or (d), it may award to the petitioning shareholder reasonable fees and expenses of counsel and
experts employed by the petitioning shareholder." Subsections 16-10a-1430(2) establishes
grounds for judicial dissolution of a corporation. Subsection 16-10a-1430(2)(b) provides grounds
for dissolution if "the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or
will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent." Subsection 16-10a-1430(2)(d)
10

provides grounds for dissolution if "the corporate assets are misapplied or wasted."
Plaintiff argues that the Defendants colluded against the Plaintiff in a self-serving effort
to force the Plaintiff out of the corporation to benefit themselves at the Plaintiffs and the
corporation's detriment. The Court finds that Plaintiff was denied corporate records and
information, computer passwords were changed to prevent Ms access to corporate information,
employees and clients were solicited and instructed to side with Defendants and the Plaintiff was
evicted from his office.
Plaintiff also alleges misapplication and waste of corporate assets. Specifically,
Defendant Scott Jackson has for some time failed to follow the corporate policy requiring each
employee to maintain daily records of their work time and that all work in progress and billable
time be promptly and fully recorded.
The Court noted at the end of the trial that absent a marriage certificate, this case
amounted to a nasty divorce in which previously loyal and trusted partners were turned against
each other. Employees were forced to pick between their jobs and loyalty to the remaining
partners. Plaintiff was removed both physically and emotionally from the accounting firm that
he helped start over 22 years ago. It is disappointing to the Court that educated, intelligent and
otherwise reasonable men cannot resolve then differences except through the measures taken in
this case.
Nevertheless, this case is not about a marriage; it is about a business. Partners and
shareholders have the right to make decisions that they deem in the best interest of the company;
however unpleasant they may be. It is clear to the Court that Mr. Jackson's buying into the firm
changed the environment of PA J. More emphasis was placed on growth and profit. This change
in direction created conflict and unfortunately, that conflict resulted in the case before the Court.
The fact remains that a majority of the shareholders were convinced that the new business
practices of PAJ were what was needed to keep PAJ a viable and profitable company, including
firing the founding partner. There was not enough evidence nor is this Court going to speculate
regarding the viability or wisdom of the new direction PAJ was taking. The Court does find that
while the Defendants' actions may have been insensitive, disloyal, exclusionary, or overly
11

aggressive, they were not oppressive.
Further, while the Court notes that Scott Jackson's admitted billing practices could be
described as contrary to his espoused philosophy of sound fiscal management of the company,
they do not rise to the level of a misapplication or a waste of corporate assets. Therefore,
attorney fees and costs will not be awarded.
5.

What, if any, are Defendants' credits and off-sets against Plaintiffs claims?
Defendants claim offsets of income received by Plaintiff from Utah State University at

the end of 2006 before they had formally terminated Plaintiffs employment. Defendants also
claim an offset of the $24,522.25 of passive investment income which Plaintiff received after his
termination.
Because the income received by Plaintiff from Utah State University took away income
that PAJ might have otherwise received from Plaintiff and because this income was earned
before he was terminated, these payments should be offset against Plaintiffs value of bis shares
as of December 31,2006. This amount is $4,829.94.
The contractual arrangement between Plaintiff and PAJ for the investment income was
for Plaintiff to pay rent in the amount equal to Plaintiffs commissions and receipts from the
investment income. Once Plaintiff was terminated, he was entitled to all fature income that
flowed from his qualifications as a licensed investment advisor. No offset of $24,522.25 is
allowed.
6.

Are Defendants' entitled to any damages under their counterclaim?
Defendants argue that Plaintiff violated his covenant not to compete under his

Employment Agreement with PAJ. The Court finds that Plaintiff did not violate his Employment
Agreement with PAJ and as such, Defendants are not entitled to any damages on their
counterclaim.
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CONCLUSION
(1) The Court determines tire fair value of Plaintiff s shares in PAJ to be $459,000.00.
PAJ had the business prerogative to increase the cash reserves; therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled
to any distribution thereof.
(2) The investment practice of Plaintiff belonged to Plaintiff.
(3) Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest relating back to December 31,2006. The
equitable interest shall be 6.99% per annum for the year 2007, 5.42% per annum for the year
2008, and 2.40% for the year 2009.
(4) Defendants did not engage in oppressive conduct or misapplication or wasting of
assets. Therefore, attorney fees and costs will not be awarded.
(5) Plaintiffs judgment will be offset by Plaintiffs Utah State University income of
$4,929.94. No offset is allowed for Plaintiffs passive investment income.
(6) Defendants are not entitled to any damages on their counterclaim.
Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to prepare a judgment in conformance with this Decision.

Dated this / 7 da^
day April, 200#
BY THE COURT:

COURT JUDGE
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P.C. appeal to the Utah Supreme Court the final Judgment of the Honorable Judge Kevin Allen
entered into in this matter on May 6, 2009, as modified by his Memorandum Decision entered
into on July 20, 2009. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment.
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REPLY MEMORANDUM TN
SUPPORT OF
MOTIONS FOR AMENDMENT OF
JUDGMENT, RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT AND AMENDMENT OF
FINDINGS
and
MOTION TO STAY
Case No. 06-0102504
Judge: Kevin Allen

COMES NOW, Defendants and Counterclaim Plaintiffs, D. Scott Jackson, Alan D. Allred, and Peterson
Allred Jackson, P.C. (hereinafter collectively "PAJ"), by and tlirough counsel, Mark Hancey, Hancey Law
Offices, and herebyfilesthis REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS FOR AMENDMENT OF
JUDGMENT, RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND AMENDMENT OF FINDINGS and MOTION TO STAY as
follows.
I.

INTRODUCTION
The Court's May 6,2007 Judgment (hereinafter "Judgment") incorporated the Courts Findings as stated

in its April 17,2009 Decision (hereinafter "Decision") pursuant to Rule 52(a) URCP.
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(a)

Findings Pertaining to the Value of Scott Jackson's 2001 Buy-In and the Fair Value of Peterson's

Shares
PA J seeks first to amend the Court'sfindingspertaining to the Court's calculated value of D. Scott
Jackson's (hereinafter "Jackson") 2001 buy-in and the subsequent findings that flow therefrom—most
significantly the fan value of Jack W. Peterson's (hereinafter "Peterson") shares.
Justification for these amendments are founded on three independent grounds: Rule 60(a)(6) URCP, Rule
60(b) URCP and Rule'59(a)(6) URCP. Under these provisions, the Court's calculation is mathematically
incorrect, thereby constituting a clerical mistake arising from oversight or omission, correctable under Rule 60(a)
URCP; the miscalculation constitutes a mistake, inach>ertence or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) URCP
and Rule 60(b)(6) URCP; and/or there is insufficient evidence to justify the Court's calculated value of Jackson's
2001 buy-in under Rule 59(a)(6) URCP.
PAJ submits that once the 2001 Jackson buy-in is correctly calculated, the Court must, by necessity,
amend its determination of the fair value of Jack W. Peterson's ("Peterson") shares, given the Court has
acknowledged it was "influenced heavily" by Jackson's 2001 buy-in and considered it a "guidepost" in its
Decision.
(b)

Necessity of Additional Findings
PAJ further seeks 7 additionalfindingsunder Rule 52(b) URCP. Absent thesefindings,PAJ submits the

Decision is not "sufficiently detailed [to] include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." See. Andrus v. Andrus> 196 P.3d 754 (Ut Ct. App. 2009)
at 759.
(c)

Motion to Stay
PAJ has also moved to stay the Judgment pending a resolution of these issues. The stay has already been

addressed (at least in part) in the Order dated June 1,2009. This Order was issued after Peterson's counsel
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obtained ex parte Writs of Execution and Garnishment and served the Writs on Lewiston State Bank and Zion's
Bank. In spite of the Court's ruling, Peterson's counsel continued to serve said Writs upon clients of Peterson
Allred Jackson, P.C. (hereinafter "PAJPC"), namely Morrell & Associates, LLC, and Academy Mortgage
Corporation.
PAJ contends that the payment of $249,611.46 to Peterson together with the additional sureties as
addressed by the Court are sufficient to entitle PAJ to a stay under Rule 52(b) URCP.

H.

PETERSON'S PROCEDURAL ATTACKS
Before addressing the three issues, PAJ will respond to the procedural attacks raised by Peterson. It is

interesting that Peterson has taken procedural attacks rather than confront the issues substantively.
(a)

Not a Motion to Reconsider
Plaintiff has suggested that the Defendants5 Motions are simply a Motion to Reconsider and should be

rejected without addressing the substantive issues raised therein. In doing so, Plaintiff cites Gillettv. Price, 135
P.3d 861 (Utah 2006). However, the reliance upon Gillett is misguided. In Gillett the moving party had in fact
filed a motion they titled a "motion to reconsider." Only thereafter did the moving party attempt to re-characterize
its motion as a Rule 59 URCP motion. In Gillett the Court held that "the form of a motion does matter because it
directs tlae court and litigants to the specific and available relief sought... Hereafter, when a party seeks relief from
judgment, it must turn to the rules to determine whether relief exists, and if so, direct the court to the specific
relief available." Id at 863, emphasis added. This is exactly what PAJ has done by citing specifically Rules
59(a), 60(a), 60(b)(1), 60(b)(6) and 52(b) URCP.
PAJ has specifically phrased and presented their Motions as motions seeking amendment ofjudgment,
relieffromjudgment and amendment of findings under Rules 59(a), 60(a), 60(b)(1), 60(b)(6) and 52(b) URCP
and as such should be entitled to the relief as provided thereby.
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With regards to Plaintiffs reliance on L.A. Young Sons Construction Company v. County oj'Tooele, 575
P.2d 1034 (Utah 1978), the case was decided in 1978, which predates the effective date of Rule 52. With the
institution of Rule 52, there is clearly a procedural option for a party to obtain relief from a judgment.
This Court relied heavily upon Exhibit 83 in calculating the value of the Jackson buy-in. However, the
Court was silent on Dr. Bowies' report on this very issue. Dr. Bowies' report contains the only testimony on the
present value of the Notes, which properly calculated present value of Jackson's buy-in and the fair value of
Peterson's shares based on this historical transaction. Dr. Bowies' report on these points was undisputed. For Hie
Court to rule contrary to that sole testimony constitutes an error of calculation and a ruling not supported by
sufficient evidence.
(b)

Affidavits Are Unnecessary
Peterson has also contended that PAJ's Motions did not include an Affidavit or reference to the transcript

In regards to the claim of the necessity of an affidavit, it would appear that Peterson's counsel has incorrectly read
Rule 59(c) URCP, which requires affidavits only when a party is seeking relief under 59(a)(1), (2), (3), and (4)
UUCP. The relief sought herein is under Rule 59(a)(6) and (7) UUCP. Unlike an appellate ruling, the need to
reference specific transcripts is not called-for in the motions, likely because of the unavailability of the transcripts
within the short timeframe required to file. Nonetheless, contained within this Reply Memorandum, PAJ lias
cited both transcript and other admitted exhibits.
Peterson's counsel also stated that PAJ's Motions do not comply with Rule 61 URCP., However, PAJ has
not sought relief under Rule 61 UUCP, and therefore the contention is irrelevant.
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ffl.

AMENDMENT OF FINDINGS

(a)

Jackson Buy-In Value and Its Effect on Fair Value of Peterson's Shares
PAJ has already set forth the substance of its argument in its May 15,2009 Memorandum. PAJ has

outlined the two miscalculations of the Jackson buy-in, namely; (1) the failure to account for the present value
adjustment given the non-interest-bearing notes; and (2) the failure to value the entire transaction—namely
Jackson's acquisition of a 1/3 interest in PAJPC, not the 17.5% interest the court used in its calculation.
1. Evidence of Present Value
In addition to the citations referenced in PAJ's May 15,2009 Memorandum, PAJ refers the Court to page
4 of the Business Valuation of Tyler J. Bowles (hereinafter "Bowles Report"), wherein Dr. Bowles specifically
calculated the present value of the notes. Dr. Bowles stated as follows:

On September 21, 2001, D. Scott Jackson purchased a one-third interest in PAJfPC] to be
effective January 1, 2002 by executing three promissory notes to the following individuals: Mr.
Peterson, Mr. Alfred, and to his parents.8 Based on the principal payments specified in these
notes, a present value date of January 1, 2002, and a discount (interest) rate of 8.0 percent, the
present values of these three notes were $41.743. $41.743, and $43,026. respectively, for a total
purchase price of $126,512. Per PAJ[PC]'s 2001 corporate tax return, gross receipts for 2001
were $752,562, which includes $31,942 from investment advisory services included on schedule
K. Therefore, Mr. Jackson paid approximately 17.0 percent of revenue for his one-third interest
(emphasis added)
The notes to Mi*. Alfred and Mr. Peterson were later modified as part of negotiations concerning the
compensation of officers. Present value calculations are based on the original notes.

The Court correctly stated the principal amount of the notes executed by Jackson to Peterson and Alan D.
Allred (hereinafter "Allred").1 See. Decision, Page 6. However, the court did not make any present value

1
Trial Exhibit 18 did not contain the original notes, but merely amended notes. The notation on Jackson's Note to Allred as
part of Trial Exliibit 18 acknowledges these amendments. Bowles referenced these amendments in footnote 8 of page 4 of
the Bowles Report when he stated, as above: "The notes to Mr. Alhed and Mr. Peterson were later modified as part of
negotiations concerning the compensation of officers. Piesent value calculations are based on the original notes." The
(continued)
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adjustment for the fact that these notes were non-interest-bearing. Hie Court should rely on the only expert to
value both the 2001 Jackson buy-in and the fair value of Peterson's shares based upon that historical transaction.
By correctly accounting for present value, the combined total of the three notes executed by Jackson is
reduced from $206,850 to $126,063.
Furthermore, Scott Jackson discussed these notes during trial and their relation to cash flow and fair value
as follows:
At that time, I don't think any one of us had any experience in what we were doing and certainly
not me at that point in tune. But, nevertheless, we were dealing with two small firms, we were
bringing them together, we felt the most equitable way to bring them together was just to simply
say okay let's look at what this revenue firm is what this revenue firm is. There were a few other
adjustments and we brought them together. I still at that time looked and said okay, well let's
look and see what I can cash flow and that'll make sense to me. So the notes and all of that, they
bear no interest for seven years. The reason they bear no interest, or one of the reasons that they
bear no interest is because again, you can only cash flow so much. You can't pay more for
something than what it can cash flow you, after having a reasonable wage. So I signed a note
with my parents. As Jack says it, he was protecting them—I appreciate that effort, I signed a
note with Jack and Alan. All of those notes contained no interest for a long period of time, I think
seven years, and then Jack and Alan's kicked in I think a nominal interest. And, I don't
remember what my parents' note says to be honest with you. (See. Trial Transcript, February 20,
2009 at 10:24.31 AM)

Making a present value adjustment for these payment terms is an essential component in properly
calculating Jackson's buy-in value and purchase price for his percentage in PAJPC. The Court need look no
further than the award of interest to Peterson in the present case to see the value of interest in a purchase. The
concepts of time value of money and present value calculations are such elementary and fundamental concepts of
finance that one can only conclude that this oversight was an inadvertent error by the Court, as well as a Decision
that is not supported by the evidence.

Second Affidavit of Alan D. Ailred dated July 1, 2009 discusses in more detail the amendments to the initial promissory
notes to Peterson and Ailred. See Second Affidavit of Alan D. Ailredfiledcontemporaneously herewith.
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The Court has stated that the value of Jackson's 2001 buy-in was "... a guidepost in its decision." See.
Decision, Page 7. The Court further noted on page seven that it was "... influenced heavily by this transaction"
(emphasis added). Given the reliance on this number, it is reasonable to expect that this number should be
accurately calculated at its 2001 present value.
2. Evidence that transaction was for a 1/3 interest
The Court's Decision calculated Jackson's 2001 buy-in value as 15.83% of the company's gross sales of
$750,000 times 0.9 to arrive at Jackson's purchase price of $106,852. The Court used this premise in calculating
Peterson's current share value at $517,763. See. Decision, Page 6. However, both Exhibit 83 and the testimony
of Jack Peterson confirm that the $750,000 was used as the combined revenue of both Peterson Allied, P C ,
(hereinafter "PA") and Jackson, Downs, & Associates Financial Services, LLC (hereinafter "JDA"). Jackson
purchased 33% of the two combined firms, not 15.83%.
The following Table compares the difference in the price per percentage of ownership in the company
based on the Court's calculation of 15.83% interest and the actual calculation, of 33.33% ownership interest in the
combined companies. See. Table 1 Below.
TABLE 1 - Value per 1% Membership Interest
TOTAL
GROSS
SALES

NOTES USED IN
CALCULATING $

BUY-IN
PERCENT

BUY-IN
AMOUNT

$ VALUE PER 1%
INTEREST

'3cW3craA"n0NJ
CORRECTED

RESULTING
GROSS SALES
MULTIPLE

j - At •«* £

$750,000

33 33%

Peterson ($53,425),
Allrcd ($53,425),
D&K Jackson ($100,00)

5206,850 00

$6,206 12

^±/^aY

0 83

Mr. Peterson's own testimony confirms the $750,000 was the combined revenues of both JDA and PA.
At Trial, Peterson stated as follows
Mr. Jenkins- Alright, so tell me what was the agreement that resulted in the January 1, 2002
coming-together.
Mr. Peterson: What we decided was that were going to combine the firms effective January 1,
2002...And so the value that we assigned was $587,000 [for PA], and Til just round those. The
06-0102504 - REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTIONS FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

PAGE 7 OF 18

value thai came in from the Jackson Downs clients was $123,000, making a total of $711,000
This represented the twelve month period ending 10-31-00 Scott was going to come in on
January 1,2002. We agreed at that time that the sales at that point would approximate $750,000.
{See, Trial Transcript, February 20,2009 at 9:10 AM)
3. Combined effect of correcting both calculations
Tlie Court has the opportunity to correct botlrof these errors:firstby properly reviewing the purchase
price of 1/3 interest through the sum of tlie three notes executed, and second, by using the proper present value
adjustment to those notes. Once the Court has done so, the correct value of Peterson's shares based upon the
Jackson buy-in is not $517,763, as the Court suggests, but ratlier $287,646 21. See. May 15,2009 Memorandum,
Page 5.
By necessity, this correction would result in the Court adjusting the fair value of Peterson's shares to
coincide with this guidepost Tables 2 and 3 below (originally mcluded as Schedule 2 in the May 15,2009
Memorandum) show that tlie correctly calculated 2001 buy-in correlates well with tlie income approaches of both
experts and tlie 2001 historical transaction. As such, PAJ requests the Court make the proper adjustments to the
2001 buy-in and adjust the fau* value of Peterson's shares accordingly and consistent with the values shown in
Tables 2 and Table 3 below.
TABLE 2 - Income/Market Approach Comparisons Among Experts
Valuation
Approach

Valuation Method

.

Income

ircome

Market
r

V^ket

Expert

Average of Value
Range

Jackson

Average of Income
Methods

Townsend

Derived Value of
P4JPC before
Personal Goodwill
Allocation

Value of Peterson's
36.37% Ownership
before Personal
Goodwill Allocation

$236,405

Jackson's court testimony

$734,388

$267,097

Townsend Report, Schedule A

S W ^ S ^ S T

^fiH

$8i9,i20

$297,914

3owles Report, Exlnbit 8 (p2.)

$1,618,547

$588,665

Townsend Report, Schedule A

$650,000
1

Historcal Transaction

Bowles

Average of IvdajJcitr
Methods

TO\N riser d
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TABLE 3 - Scatter Plot Showing Value Ranges1
Value of Peterson's 36.37% Ownership

Value of PAJ
1.700,000

•

1,500,000
!

600,000

I

M

1,300,000
500,000
.1,100,000
•Townssrd Values
• Bowles Values
|

900,000

i*

700,000

*

^

• Townsend Values

JL Jackson Value

A Jackson Value

• Court Values

• Court Values
300,000

I*

500,000
200,000
300,000

**

100,000

100,000

(b)

• Bowies Values

400,000

Mathematical Errors Constitute an Error Under Rule 60 URCP
The Supreme Court of Utah addressed specifically whether a mathematical error constitutes an error

correctable under Rule 60(a) URCP in Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Insurance, 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983).
Stanger is especially important because the mathematical error carried forward by tlie court was tlie result of an
incorrect calculation witliin a particular exiiibit (similar to the fact that Exiiibit 83 did not address tlie non-interestbearing notes). In its remand to seek Hie correction of the calculation, the Supreme Court noted the following
(&«./£ at 1206):
Under Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, tlie trilal court may correct clerical
mistakes in judgments at any time... In explanation of the intent of the identical Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure, tlie comment has been made that "in this broad approach to correctibility under
Rule 60(a), it matters little whether an error was made by tlie court clerk, the jury foreman,
counsel, a party, or tlie judge himself, so long as it is clearly a formal error that should be
corrected in tlie interest of having judgment, order, or other part of the record reflec; what was
done or intended." Annot, 13 A.L.R. Fed. 794 (1972). The definition of "clerical mistake" thus
extends to include the one here discovered. "It is a type of mistake or omission mechanical in
1

The values shown in Table 3 are before personal goodwill allocation.
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nature which is apparent on the record and which does not involve a legal decision or judgment
by an attorney." In Re Merry Queen Thmsfer Corp., 266 F.Supp. 605, 607 (1967).
In Nielsen v. Nielsen, 2000 WL 33249399 (Ut. Ct. App. 2000), the Court of Appeals also remanded, not
only because of mathematical errors, but because the metliodology employed by the court was flawed, concluding
"the methodology it [the trial court] employed in arriving at the $76,137.99 total judgment was flawed..."
(c)

Additional Case Law Regarding Correction of Mathematical Errors
Utah courts have also addressed the question of mathematical errors outside the Rule 60 URCP context.

InAndrus v. Andrus, 196 P.3d 754 (Ut. Ct. App. 2009), a divorce matter, the husband appealed the lower court's
puling based upon a miscalculation of alimony. The husband contended that the court based the calculation on his
gross monthly income instead of his net monthly income. See. Id. at 759. The Court of Appeals remanded the
case for additional findings to ensure that the court's decision would be "sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Id at
759. In the case, the Court of Appeals also found the following:

Here, the trial court arrived at its alimony award by awarding Wife half of Husband's monthly
disposable income. The trial court determined Husband's disposable income by subtracting
certain expenses, including housing, food, transportation, and child support, from Husband's
stipulated gross monthly income. The findings of fact are silent on the issue of Husband's tax
obligations and monthly net income. Even though there is some evidence in the record
concerning the amount of taxes Husband pays, including testimony by Wife and documentary
evidence provided by Husband, we cannot ascertain how or if the trial court contemplated
Husband's duty to pay taxes in calculating his disposable income. The trial court's findings of fact
are not sufficiently detailed to show the steps it took determining Husband's disposable income.
We therefore reverse and remand for adequate findings that will show proper consideration of
Husband's net income. (Id at 759)

The present case is similar in that PAJ contends that the Court failed to calculate the present value of the
note.
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The Supreme Court of Wyoming also addressed this question in Wallop v. Wallop, 88 P.3d 1022
(Wyoming 2004). In Wallop, the husband appealed that the district court made a mathematical error when it
awarded the wife with 29% of a lifetime annuity. See. Id. at 1034. The husband contended that tlie court
incorrectly calculated tlie number of months in detennining the percentage allocation. Hie Supreme Court agreed
and ordered the award be modified to reflect the proper percentages and amounts. See. Id. at 1034-1035.

IV.

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS REQUESTED

(a)

Introduction
PAJ further requests the Court make seven additionalfindingsof fact and law that were not addressed in

the Court's Decision, but are necessary in calculating fair value of Peterson's shares.
The Utah Supreme Court in 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 99 P.3d 801 (Utah 2004), has stated that
"[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal [J the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the
trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." Id. at 813 (Citing Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v
Peebles, 48 P.3d 968). The seven additional requested findings of fact below are simply absent from tlie Court's
Decision, but they have a significant impact upon determining fair value of die case. Because the findings are
absent from the Court's Decision, any appellate court would not be able to determine tlie District Court's opinion
on these issues. As such, through its Motions, PAJ has given the District Court "notice of the asserted error [to]
allow for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding." Id. at 813. b doing so, PAJ has also reserved
for appeal those issues.
(b)

Case Law Regarding Rule 52 URCP and Incomplete Findings
The courts are replete and consistent in then*findingsthat "It is tlie duty of the trial court to make findings

on all material issues raised by the pleadings, and failure to do so is regarded as reversible error." Piper v. Hatch,
43 P.2d 700 (Utah 1935). (See also. Cookv. Cook, 174P.2d434 (Utah 1940).
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As far back as 1928, the Supreme Court of Utah held in Prows v. Hawley, 211 P. 31 (Utah 1928), that "it
is the undoubted rule, that until the court has found on all the material issues raised by the pleadings, the findings
are insuflicient to support a judgment; and that findings should be sufficiently distinct and certain as not to require
an investigation or review to determine what issues are decided." Id. at 33.
Simply put, there are several issues the Court's Decision failed to address. In its Motion, PAJ has
presented the issues to the Court in such a way that the Court has an opportunity to rule on each issue and has put
the Trial Judge on notice of the asserted error and allow for the correction of that error. This process is not only
proper under Rule 52 URCP, it is required given the holding in 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 99 P.3d 801
(Utah 2004).
(c)

The 7 Additional Findings Requested by PAJ
The 7 requested findings are as follows:
1. Additional Finding Requested #1 - The Courtfailed to address the issue of whether, as a matter of
law, an adjustment to fair value should be made when taking into account enterprise versus personal
goodwill This issue was well briefed beginning on Page 17 of the Bowles Report, and the court heard
significant testimony on this issue at trial.
The Court's Decision does not address in any respect the issue of enterprise versus professional goodwill.

This is a question of law.
Utah courts have already held in divorce cases that professional goodwill must be excluded when
determining fair value. Dr. Bowles5 report, beginning on page 18, discusses this issue. In citing Soremen v.
Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992) at 775, Dr. Bowles states, '"It would not be equitable to require him [the
dentist husband] to pay his wife part of the value ascribed to the goodwill [of the practice], because the goodwill
of a sole practitioner is nothing more than his or her reputation for competency...'
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In the present case, it is inequitable from an economic perspective and improper as a matter of law to
require Alan AUred and Scott Jackson to purchase goodwill "thai is due to their personal reputations, which they
already own and are nontransferable." See. Bowles Report; Page 19.
The Court of Appeals further addressed the issue of goodwill in Stonehocker v. Stonehocker7176 P.3d
476 (Ut. Ct. App. 2008). Stonehocker was, again, a divorce case where the fair value of the husband's business
was to be determined. Therein, the Court of Appeals agreed with Hie trial court that the "value should be
deteimined independent of any goodwill component. 'There can be no good will in a business that is dependent
for its existence upon Hie individual who conducts the enterprise and would vanish were the individual to die,
retire or quit work."5 Id at 490 (citing Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 95 (Ut C\. App. 1988) at 956).
Both Stonehocker and Sorensen cite several other cases that carve out a professional's goodwill in a
business valuation when detennining fair value of that business. In Stonehocker, the court made a note in
footnote 19 that excluding goodwill is even more important when evaluating a professional practice. See.
Stonehocker at 490.
Dr. Bowles3 makes an adjustment of enterprise versus personal goodwill in each of his market,
investment and income approaches. See. Bowles Report, Exhibit 8, Page 21. Dr. Bowles also testified
extensively on this allocation of professional and personal goodwill.
Mr. Townsend acknowledges in his Rule 26 Report of R. Brad Townsend (hereinafter "Townsend
Report") that he has included goodwill in his company valuations. See. Townsend Report, Page 19. However,
Mr. Townsend refused to adjust for any goodwill, which PAJ asserts is an error as a matter of law. The Court's
Decision fails to make any legal findings on this issue of law.
In short, PAJ contends thai as a matter of law, professional goodwill must be excluded from the fan* value
calculation.

06-0102504 -REPLYMEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTIONS FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

PAGE 13 OF 18

As a matter of law, professional goodwill must be stripped out of this valuation. The Court's ruling is
silent on this issue.
2. Additional Finding Requested #2 - Once the legal conclusion regarding goodwill is resolved, the
Court then must make afinding as to the proper adjustment to fair value.
Much of the analysis for this additional finding is discussed above. Simply put, PAJ contends that as a
matter of law the Court's adjustment should be consistent with the only expert to testify on this matter, Dr.
Bowles.3
3. Additional Finding Requested #3 - TJie Court failed to make a finding regarding reasonable
compensation for the shareholders and how such compensation affects PAJPC'sfair value.
The experts testified to three different reasonable compensation numbers. Mr. Bowles asserted that
reasonable compensation for the shareholders is $110,000.4 Mr. Townsend, on the other hand, provided two
separate numbers, $88,000 and $124,000.5 Both experts acknowledged that reasonable compensation is a
necessary element in determining valuation. Additionally, Dr. Bowles analyzed the value of reasonable
compensation and its relation to cash flow as follows:

The cash paid to owners is the starting point for calculating the cash flow amount to be
capitalized. But this amount does not represent the benefit of ownership as each owner worked
full-time for PAJ[PC] during this period. A reasonable return to the labor of these owners must
be deducted from the cash paid to the owners in order to arrive at a measure of the benefit of
ownership...I want to emphasize that $300,000 is a conservative estimate of the cost of retaining
the services of the three owners. An estimate of $350,000 is well within reason. This latter
amount is higher than cash actually paid to the owners in every year of Hie past 10 with the
exception of 2005. This is the same obvious point as made earlier: The owners of PAJ[PC] own
a good job, but after accounting for that fact, there is little economic benefit associated with
ownership of the stock of PA J[PC]. (See. Bowles Report, Pages 7-8)

3

See. Bowles Report, Page 19-20.

4

See. Bowles Report, Page 8.

5

See. Townsend Report, Schedule E, Note A (2006 Adjusted Compensation to Officers of $266,888 / 3), and Townsend
Repoit, Schedule N (Officer's compensation equals 23.5% of sales—23.5°/o*l,583,495 respectively)
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The consequences of determining reasonable compensation to shareholders are evident in Trial Exhibit
94.2. Officer compensation would be only $64,084 (well below any of tlie experts' stated reasonable
compensation numbers) attlie Court's stated fair value of $459,000.00 for Peterson's 36.67% interest, equating to
$1,262,029 for PAJPC.
4. Additional Finding Requested #4 - The Courtfailed to make any findings justifying the applicability
of Townsend*s market analysis, including a finding as to whether Townsend's market data is
comparable to PAJPC given the vast discrepancy between Townsend's market and income approaches.
Before tlie Court can begin the weighting of any market approach, it must first determine if tlie proposed
market approaches are comparable.6 The Hogle Court determined that the experts' values should be
"substantially disregarded as unreliable" precisely because the comparables offered were not comparable. Id at
88.
This Court noted "there was never an established method in determining the percentage weight of each
value..." See, Decision, Page 6. However, PAJ submits that prior to even addressing tlie issue of weighting, tlie
Court must make a finding as to whether or not tlie market analysis by Towqsend is comparable and why. Absent
such a finding, an appellate court could not determine tlie basis the trial court used in accepting Townsend's
market approach as comparable.
5. Additional Finding Requested #5 - The Courtfailed to make a finding adjusting Townsend's admitted
miscalculation of "Price/Sellers Discretional Earnings." See. Townsend Report Schedule A.
Townsend admitted to using EBIDA plus all owners compensation, rather than the accurate definition
of Sellers discretional earnings which is EBIDA plus one owners compensation, Townsend also
acknowledged on the stand that the value should have been $1,08^,000 rather than $1,522,469.
During Townsend's cross examination, beginning at 4:20 PM on February 18,2009, Townsend read and
acknowledged the correct definition of Seller's Discretionary Earnings, as seated in Trial Exhibit 94.7—namely,

3

See. Hogle vZmeticsMed, Inc., 63 P.3d 80 (Utah 2002) at I
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sellers discretionary earnings "is equal to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization
(EBITDA) plus all compensation, benefits, and perks to one owner/operator/' (emphasis added) Townsend then
acknowledged that when calculating discretionary earnings to establish the value of $1,522,469 in Schedule A of
his report, he used compensation for all owners. Townsend acknowledged at 4:21.31 PM that valuation of the
company based upon sellers discretionary earnings given the acknowledged definition contained in Exhibit 94.7 is
$1,081,431 rather than $1,522,469.
6. Additional Finding Requested #6 - The Court failed to make any findings as to how this adjustment
would impact Townsend3s weighting of values.
The consequences of the correction to sellers discretionary earnings are two-fold: first, it adjusts
Townsend5s market value; and second, it establishes the vast disparity between the various market approaches,
which Townsend did not account for in his weighting (another reason for the Court to rely upon the experts5
income approaches and to ignore Townsend's market approaches entirely.)
7. Additional Finding Requested #7 - The Courtfailed to make afinding as to how the exclusion of the
investment practice affects PA JPC's fair value since both experts included investment practice in their
valuations ofPAJPC.
Mr. Peterson and Mr. Jackson both testified that all income and expenses associated with the investment
practice were contained within the company's financials. Both experts used those company financials in their
valuations, yet the Court made no adjustment in fail* value of PAJPC exclusive of the investment practice after
ruling to exclude the investment practice.

V.

MOTION TO STAY
This issue has already been somewhat resolved by the Court during the May 29, 2009 Healing, which

resulted in Hie Order dated June 1,2009. The issue was ftnthei briefed by PAJ in its Objection to Immediate
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Request for Hearing and Reconsideration dated June 22,2009, PAJ incorporates that language herein, and to
summarize, point out the issue of payment within ten days as follows.
Plaintiff properly points out that Judgments are enforceable ten days after entry pursuant to Rule 62(a)
URCP. Since this is so, the Court needs to look closer as to why the Parties referenced the ten days in the Pretrial
Order. The January 12,2009 Hearing answers this question. Prior to the January 12,2009 Hearing, PAJ had
sought the right to seek payment in installments as authorized under § 16-10a-1434(5)(a) UCA. However, in an
effort to avoid the need to disclose updated financials to Mr. Peterson and to his expert, and to avoid the necessity
of bifurcating a trial, PAJ waived the right to seek payment in installments.7
PAJ respectfully requests the Court continue the stay in consideration of the payment of $249,611.46,
together with the line of credit PAJ maintains with Lewiston State Bank for $250,000, to be sufficient sureties.
The disruption and complications evidenced by the Writs sought by the Plaintiff demonstrate the need for
a stay pending the resolution of these issues. The payment of almost $250,000 to Peterson in the interim, while
not required under stay proceedings, is a significant relief to Peterson, relief that is not often called for to obtain a
stay.

VI.

CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfully submit their MOTIONS FOR AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT, RELIEF FROM

JUDGMENT AND AMENDMENT OF FINDINGS and MOTION TO STAY and respectfully request the Court
take this opportunity to correct the mathematical errors indicated herein and to make the suggested additional
findings necessary to clarify the Court's Decision and provide a basis to ascertain the Court's methodology in
reaching its conclusions on the value of the PAJPC shares. As the Court continues in this corrective process,

7

See. January 12,2009 Hearing Transcript starting at 3:31.35 PM.
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Defendants respectfully urge the Court to enter its stay of the judgment so that Defendants are not further
penalized by Plaintiff's aggressive collection tactics.

DATED this J_

day of July, 2009.
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Mark Hancey (USB 06884)
HANCEY LAW OFFICES
121 N. Springcreek Pkwy.; Suite 200
Providence, Utah 84332
Telephone: (435) 787-1444
Facsimile: (435) 755-5152
Attorneyfor Defendants, Counterclaim Plaintiffs
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JACK W.PETERSON
Plaintiff and
Counterclaim Defendant
v.

]i
]>
]>
)
1
>
1

D.SCOTT JACKSON, individually; ALAND.
ALLRED, individually; and on behalf of
PETERSON ALLRED JACKSON, P.C, a
Utah Professional Corporation,
Defendants and
Counterclaim Plaintiffs

MOTIONS FOR
AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT,
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND
AMENDMENT OF FINDINGS
and
MOTION TO STAY

\
;
;1
:
|
-,

REQUEST FOR HEARING
Case No. 06-0102504
Judge: Kevin Allen

COMES NOW, Defendants and Counterclaim Plaintiffs, D. Scott Jackson, Alan D. Allred, and Peterson
Allred Jackson, P.C. (hereinafter collectively "PAJ Defendants"), by and through counsel, Mark Hancey, Hancey
Law Offices, and hereby files a MOTION FOR AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT under Rule 59(a) URCP,
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT under Rules 60(a), 60(b)(1), 60(b)(6) URCP, MOTION TO
AMEND FINDINGS OR MAKE ADDITIONAL FINDINGS under Rule 52(b) URCP, and MOTION TO STAY
pursuant to Rule 62(b) URCP. PAJ Defendants further file and REQUEST FOR HEARIN^oli said Motions.
These Motions are supported by the attached Memorandum of Points andyAtithorities in Support thereof.
Dated this /jT*day of May, 2009.
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MaTk Hancey (USB 06884)
HANCEY LAW OFFICES
121N. Springcreek Pkwy.; Suite 200
Providence, Utah 84332
Telephone: (435) 787-1444
Facsimile: (435) 755-5152
Attorneyfor Defendants, Counterclaim Plaintiffs
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JACK W.PETERSON
Plaintiff and
Counterclaim Defendant

v.

]i
])
])
>
]>
1

D.SCOTT JACKSON, individually; ALAND. \)
ALLRED, individually; and on behalf of
PETERSON ALLRED JACKSON, P.C, a
:
!
Utah Professional Corporation,
:
Defendants and
Counterclaim Plaintiffs

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTIONS FOR AMENDMENT OF
JUDGMENT, RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT AND AMENDMENT OF
FINDINGS
and
MOTION TO STAY
REQUEST FOR HEARING

:

J

Case No. 06-0102504
Judge: Kevin Alien

COMES NOW, Defendants and Counterclaim Plaintiffs, D. Scott Jackson, Alan D. Allred, and Peterson
Allred Jackson, P.C. (liereinafter collectively 'TAJ Defendants"), by and through counsel, Mark Hancey, Hancey
Law Offices, and hereby files this MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDMENT OF
JUDGMENT under Rule 59(a) URCP, MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT under Rules 60(a),
60(b)(1), 60(b)(6) URCP, MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS OR MAKE ADDITIONAL FINDINGS under
Rule 52(b) URCP, and MOTION TO STAY pursuant to Rule 62(b) URCP. PAJ Defendants further file this
Memorandum in support of their REQUEST FOR HEARING on said Motions.
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Procedural History
The Court issued a Decision dated April 17,2009 ('^Decision") in the above-referenced matter.
Subsequently, the Court entered a Judgment dated May 6,2009 ("Judgment"), which Judgment, in part, included
language incorporating the Court's Decision as the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of
the Judgment See. URCP 52(b).
PAJ Defendants have previously filed with this Court a Motion for Amendment of Decision or Relief
From Decision and Request for Hearing dated April 22,2009. However, with Hie Court entering the Judgment,
PAJ Defendants file this Motion to replace and supersede the April 22,2009 Motion.
This Motion further requests the Court stay the enforcement of the Judgment pursuant to Rule 62(b)
URCP pending resolution of the Rule 52(b), Rule 59(a)(6)-(7) and Rule 60(a), 60(b)(1), 60(b)(6), URCP Motions.
PAJ Defendants seek amendment of Judgment, relief from Judgment, and amendment of findings as
follows:
Incorrect Calculation of Jackson's Buy-In Value
The Court's Decision stated on page six, "Scott Jackson bought his shares using a value calculation of the
gross sales times 0.9, times the percentage of stock (i.e., $750,000 * .9 * 13.83% = $106,852.50)." This is not the
correct calculation of the D. Scott Jackson's ("Jackson") buy-in purchase price.
In making this calculation the Court cited Exliibit 83. Exliibit 83 does not include the transaction
documents. The Trial Exliibit List itself identifies Exliibit 83 as "Jack's IStytes related to the creation of PAJ."
The Exliibit is simply the personal notes of Jack W. Peterson ("Peterson") regarding the negotiations of the
transaction. Further, a review of the Court's docket establishes that Exliibit 83 was not introduced or admitted
during the trial, but was rather admitted at the end of trial along with the remaining exhibits in the Exliibit
Binders. As such, there was no testimony establishing foundation of the document nor any allegation that Exliibit
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83 constitutes the terms and conditions of Jackson's actual purchase. As such, there is insufficient evidence for
the Court to reasonably rely upon Exhibit 83 to establish the terms of the agreement
The Court's calculation contains two mathematical errors.
First, the Court did not calculate Jackson's buy-in multiple using the complete transaction. The complete
transaction was the purchase by Jackson of a 33.33% (15.83% from Peterson and Alan D. Allred ("Allred") and
17.50%fromDennis and Karen Jackson) interest in the combined entities of Jackson, Downs & Associates
("JDA") and Peterson Allred ("PA"). The gross revenues of $750,000, referenced by the Court, and Peterson's
notes, were the sum of the gross revenues of both JDA and PA.1
The terms of the transaction were memorialized by the parties in the execution of three promissory notes
payable to Peterson, Allred, and Dennis and Karen Jackson from Jackson. A copy of the notes are attached hereto
as Schedule 1. The multiple based on the complete transaction, without accounting for the present value of the
payments, is .83 (i.e. $206,8502 / $250,0003), not .90.
Second, the Court failed to adjust its calculated buy-in value to its present value. The notes to Peterson
and Allred bore 0% interest over the first five years. The note to Demiis and Karen Jackson bore 0% interest until
June 1,2016.
PAJ Defendants* counsel raised this issue of non-interest bearing notes at the April 16,2009 hearing.
However, the Court did not account for any present value calculations in its analysis.

1

Page 4 of Trial Exhibit 83 included a Profit and Loss Statement of Peterson Allred showing revenues of $558,516.50.
Even when outside revenuesfromUSU of $12,918.00 and Logan City of $16,277.00 are added to that number as described in
Page 3 of Exhibit 83, the total revenue of Peterson Allred totals only $587,711.00. The balance of $750,000 is the gross
revenue of JDA.
2

The amount equals the sum of Peterson's note ($53,425) Alfred's note ($53,425), and Dennis and Karen Jackson's note
($100,000).
3

$250,000 equals 1/3 of the gross revenues of the combined entities JDA and PA at the time of Jackson's original purchase.
Jackson paid $206,850, before discounting, for 1/3 of JDA and PA combined.
06-0102504 - MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS FOR AMENDMENT OF
JUDGMENT, RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND AMENDMENT OF FINDINGS
AND MOTION TO STAY / REQUEST FOR HEARING

PAGE 3 OF 10

Making a present value adjustment for these payment terms is an essential component in properly
calculating Jackson's buy-in value. The Court need look no further than the award of interest to Peterson in the
present case.
The concepts of time value of money and present value calculations are such elementary and fundamental
concepts offinancethat one can only conclude that this oversight was an inadvertent error by the Court Such an
error justifies relieffromjudgment and/or amended judgment under URCP Rules 59 and 60(a).
The Court has stated that the value of Jackson's buy-in was "... a gpidepost in its decision." See.
Decision, page seven. The Court further noted, on page seven, that it was "...influencedheavily by this
transaction" (emphasis added). Given the reliance on this number, it is reasonable to expect that this number
should be accurately calculated at its present value. Or, in the alternative, the Court should allow Defendants to
pay the judgment over the same terms as the prior transaction, namely: 51.66% of the judgment to be paid over
7.5 years with 5 years no interest and 48.34% of the judgment to be paid over 14.5 years with no interest and
payments beginning at 7.5 years. In doing so, the Court would be consistent in its analysis.
The Correct Calculation of Jackson's Buy-in Value
Mr. Townsend did not calculate any value of Peterson Allred Jackson, P.C. ("PAJ") based upon Jackson's
original purchase.
Mr. Bowles is the only expert that calculated the present value of this transaction. See. Bowles Report
Page 16 and Exhibit 6. Mr. Bowles' market analysis was based upon the 2001 Jackson buy-in transaction. Mr.
Bowles stated in his report on Page 16:
As the purchase of PAJ stock by Mr. Jackson is more recent, I have used the multiple from this
purchase in my application of the market approach to value PAJ stock. Exhibit 6 represents the
value of PAJ based on this historical transaction.
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In Exhibit 6 of the Bowles Report, Bowles uses a present value multiple of. 17 to derive the value of a
33.33% interest in PAJ. The present value multiple for PAJ as a whole would be 5\*_ (i.e. .17 * 3).
When the Court correctly applies Hie total amount Jackson paid for tlie combined interest in PAJ and
JDA, and further makes the necessary present value adjustments, the correct present value of Jackson's buy-in to
PAJ is not $106,852.50 for a 15.83% interest but rather $126,063 for a 33.33% interest. The details of this
calculation are set forth in the attached Schedule 2. The correct values result in a present value multiple of .505
(i.e. $ 126,063 / $250,0006) rather than .90.
Affect on Fair Value of Peterson's Shares
Applying the Court's rationale and analysis using the same equation that tlie Court used in its Decision,
the Court's calculation of $517,763.177 adjusts to $287,646.21 ($1,581,777.33 * .50 * 36.37%).
On page seven of it's Decision, the Court took the time to actually calculate the spread between tlie
Townsend value and the value based upon the Jackson buy-in. Hierein die Court stated: "Tlie Court points out
that this determined value is less than what the value of PAJ would have been had the Court used tlie same
formula that Mr. Jackson used to purchase his shares in PAP' (i.e. the determined value of $459,000 is less than
the Court's calculation of $517,763.17)."
When the Jackson buy-in is correctly calculated at its present value, the comparison tlie Court presented
to support its decision is turned on its head. Tlie Court's determined value of $459,000 now exceeds the value
derived using the Jackson buy-in formula by $171,353.79 or 60% (i.e. $459,000 - $287,646,21).

The difference between the present value multiple derived in the attached Schedule 2 and Bowies' report is rounding.
5

See. Footnote 4 above.

6

The $250,000 represents Jackson's original purchase of 33.33% of PAJ (i.e. $750,000 * 33.33%).

7

Referring to Peterson's shares as of 12/31/06.
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Since the Court has acknowledged the heavy influence of this prior transaction, it seems that when the
guidepost is correctly located, the Court must adjust the value of Peterson's shares to coincide with the correctlyplaced guidepost
The evidence before this Court justifies a valuation of Peterson's shares consistent with the values derived
by each expert using their respective income/investment methods, as favored by Utah Courts. See. Decision, Page
5. See also. Oakridge Energy, Inc. v. Clifton, 937 P.2d 130 (Utah 1997). These income methods compare with
the properly calculated present value of the Jackson buy-in using the Court's formula, which values PAJ at
$790,889, resulting in Peterson's 36.37% totaling $287,646.21.
The income values of each expert are as follows:
Townsend's opinion of the value of PAJ derived using his two income methods averages $734,388. See.
Townsend Report Schedule A. Consequently, the value of Peterson's 36.37% based upon Townsend's income
methods would average $267,097.
Bowles' opinion of the value of PAJ derived using his income method is $600,000. See. Bowles Report
Exhibit 7. Using Bowles' value of PAJ, Peterson's 36.37% would have a ^alue of $218,220*.
Based upon the value range Jackson presented at trial during his testimony, the Court heard from Jackson
that in his opinion the value of PAJ averages $650,000. Using Jackson's value of PAJ, the value of Peterson's
36.37% would average $236,405.
Thus, when the guidepost is correctly placed by accounting for the present value of Jackson's purchase,
these income method valuations converge around $710,000 for PAJ, with a corresponding $258,000 for
Peterson's 36.37% interest therein.

8

It should be noted that during trial the Court heard testimony that the only significant difference between the two experts in
deriving their respective values under the income approach is the issue of reasonable compensation which the Court did not
address in its Decision.
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To illustrate this convergence, PAJ Defendants have prepared a scatter plot showing these various
valuations for both PAJ and for Peterson's interest therein. See. Schedule 3 attached hereto. Each value is
somewhat different because of issues like reasonable compensation, variations in adjusted gross revenue, etc—but
they still converge. As illustrated by the scatter plot, the same cannot be said for the Townsend Market Approach.
Thus, there is insufficient evidence to find that Townsend's market approach is comparable to PAJ's fair value.
PAJ is simply an income stream to its owners. The value of that income stream must be supported by the
evidence this Court received regarding the income the asset produces. This concept was addressed in Jackson's
buy-in when the parties used long-term (non-interest bearing) notes. These notes substantially reduced the
present value of the purchase price. If the use of such notes is not available, then the Court must make
appropriate present value adjustments to Hie historical transaction. Plaintiffs own expert acknowledged this
concept when he acknowledged in cross-examination that the cash flows of PAJ would not support his own
opinion of value,
The duty of the Court is to determine the fair value rather than to simply split the difference among all the
different values it was given, or to allow an expert to do the same. The Court stated as much in its Decision when
it chose not to "take a Solomon approach and split the difference." However, splitting the difference is exactly
the approach that Townsend's valuation took between the market, income/investment and assets approaches. This
Court does not have two valuations to pickfrom—ithas the market, income/investment and asset approaches
provided by each of the experts. If the Court sees the Jackson buy-in as a time guidepost, it should then determine
which market, income and/or asset approach most approximates the guidepost. Perhaps not coincidentally, the
income approaches established independently by each expert, while not identical, do approximate the
mathematically correct calculation of Jackson's buy-in transaction. By drilling down to the individual
income/investment valuations within each expert report, the Court avoids the very issue of "splitting the
difference" that it has explicitly sought to avoid.
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Insufficiently Detailed Findings of the Court
PAJ Defendants also argue that the Findings of Fact/Law incorporated into the Judgment were
insufficiently detailed to address the issues pled at trial. The Decision of the Court further fails to make Findings
and/or Conclusions on several key issues including the following:
1. The Court failed to address the issue of whether, as a matter of law, an adjustment to fair value should be
made when taking into account enterprise versus personal goodwill This issue was well briefed
beginning on Page 17 of the Bowles Report, and the court heard significant testimony on this issue at
trial.
2. Once the legal conclusion regarding goodwill is resolved, the Court then must make a finding as to the
proper adjustment to fair value.
3. The Court failed to make a finding regarding reasonable compensation for the shareholders and how such
compensation affects PAJ's fair value.
4. The Court failed to make any findings justifying the applicability of Townsend's market analysis,
including a finding as to whether Townsend's market data is comparable to PAJ given the vast
discrepancy between Townsend's market and income approaches.
5. The Court failed to make a finding adjusting Townsend's admitted miscalculation of "Price/Sellers
Discretionary Earnings." See. Townsend Report Schedule A. Townsend admitted to using EBIDA plus
all owners compensation, rather than the accurate definition of Sellers discretionary earnings which is
EBIDA plus one owners compensation. Townsend also acknowledged on the stand that the value should
have been $1,084,000 rather than $1,522,469.
6. The Court failed to make any findings as to how this adjustment would impact Townsend's weighting of
values.
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7. The Court failed to make a finding as to how the exclusion of the investment practice affects PAJ's fair
value since both experts included investment practice in their valuations of PAJ.
Motion to Stay
PAJ Defendants further request the Court stay enforcement of the Judgment under Rule 62(b) URCP.
PAJ Defendants assert that the Decision by the Court to make Allred and Jackson jointly and severally liable for
the Judgment, together with the identified lines of credit and other assets identified by PAJ Defendants in their
Statement of Sureties dated January 22,2009 constitutes sufficient security under the limited timeframe of the
stay contemplated under the Rule 62(b) Motion. This Motion to Stay is distinguished from a Rule 62(d) Motion
to Stay pending appeal.
At hearing, the Court can take further evidence and arguments on determining the sufficiency of the
security or any additions thereto as the Court deems necessary.

06-0102504 - MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS FOR AMENDMENT OF
JUDGMENT, RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND AMENDMENT OF FINDINGS
AND MOTION TO STAY / REQUEST FOR HEARING

PAGE 9 OF 10

Conclusion
Because the Court acknowledged that it relied upon the calculation of the value of Jackson's purchase of
shares in 2002, and the calculation used by the Covrt is incorrect, Defendants submit that they are entitled to
amended findings of fact under Rule 52(b) URCP, together with an amendment of the Judgment under Rule
59(a)(6>(7) URCP or in the alternative relieffromthe Judgment und Rule 60(b)(1) URCP, Simply put, the
sufficiency of the evidence does not justify the mis-calculation of that value. Moreover, the incorrect calculation
constitutes a clerical error under Rule 60(a) URCP, "a mistake" under Rulq 60(b)(1) URCP, or "other reasons
justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6) URCP.
Additionally, PAJ Defendants have filed a Rule 62(b) URCP Motion to Stay pursuant to these Motions.

Request for Hearing
PAJ Defendants further request a hearing on their Motions.
Dated this l$~ day of May, 2009.
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PROMISSORY NOTE
$53,425.00
Logan, Utah.
September 21,2001
In installments as herein stated, for the purchase of ninety six (96) shares of Peterson Alfred Jackson,
PXX common stock, the undersigned promises to pay Jack W . Peterson, an individual, the sum o f
$ 53*425.00 to b e paid as M o w s ;
HofLDate
January 1,2002
June 1,2002
January 1,2003
June 1,2003
January 1,2004
June* 1,2004
January 1,2005
June 1,2005
January 1,2006
June 1,2006
January 1,2007
June 1,2007
January 1,2008
June 1,2008
January 1,2009
June 1,2009

..Payment
$ 2,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500,00
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.00
1,925,00

Total

>»,42ff,(ffl

Privilege is reserved to pay the note in fell at any time with no prepayment penalty. This note is non
interest bearing until January 1,2007. Thereafter, the remaining balance shall carry an interest rate
of 8 percent per annum Both principle and accrued interest shall b e payable on the respective due
date. Upon default of any payment, the prorated shares paid for will b e issued and the balance of
the note will be null and void with the prorated shares unpaid for being retained b y Jack W. Peterson.
Executed this 21 5t day of September, 2001,' at Logan, Utah.

f:\\vpdoc$Vack\pramis-i.wpd

D, Scott Jackson - Maker

6C*te*OU; I

PROMISSORY N01E
$53,425.00
Logan, Utah
September 21,2001
l a installments as herein stated, fbrfhepurcbase ofninety six (96) shares ofPeterson Alfred Jackson,
P.C. common stock, ihe undersigned promises to pay Alan D . Alfred, an individual, the sum o f
$ 53,425.00 to be paid as follows:
DaeJBata
January 1,2002
June 1,2002
January 1,2003
June 1,2003
January 1,2004
June 1,2004
January 1,2005
June 1,2005
January 1,2006
June 1,2006
January 1,2007
June 1,2007
January 1,2008
June 1,2008
January 1,2009
June 1,2009

Payment
$ 2,500,00
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.06
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.00
3,500.00
lfllSM

Total

arc.A2S.on

Privilege is reserved to pay Ihe note in full at any time with no prepayment penalty. This note is non
interest bearing until January 1,2007. Thereafter, the remaining balance shall carry an interest rate
of 8 percent per annum. Both principle and accrued interest shall be payable on the respective due
date. Upon default of any payment the prorated shares paid for will be issued and the balance o f
the note will be null and void with the prorated shares unpaid for being retained by Jack W: Peterson.
Executed this 21" day of September, 2001, at Logan, Utah.

ft\wpdoc$Bck\promij~i.wpd

D. Scott Jackson - tyeker

PROMISSORY NOTE
.$100,000
Logan, Utah
September 21,2001
ID installments as herein stated, for too purchase of foe assets of Jackson Downs & Associates
Financial Services, LLC, <he undersigned promises to pay Dennis and ICaren Jackson, individuals,
me sum of $ 100,000.00 to be paid as follows:

Pue.Pate

Jfryiwnt

June 1,2009
January 1,2010
June 1,2010
January 1,2011
June 1,2011
January 1,2012
June 1,2012
January 1,2013
June 1,2013
January 1,2014
June 1,2014
January 1,2015
June 1,2015
January 1,2016
June 1,2016

$3,150.00
7,000.00
7,000.00
7,000.00
7,000.00
7,000.00
7,000.00
7,000.00
7,000.00
7,000.00
7,000.00
7,000.00
7,000.00
7,000.00
3.850.00

Total
Privilege is reserved to pay &e note in M at any time with, no prepayment penalty. This note is non
interest bearing until June 1,2016. Thereafter, the remaining balance shall carry an interest rate of
8 percent per annum. Both principle and accrued interest shall be payable on the respective due
date.
Executed this 21" day of September, 2001, at Logan, Utah.

ftWaiaVaoMpromis-i.wpd

D . Scott Jackson - Maker

I, Dennis W. Jackson, do hereby relinquish any claim against Peterson ADred Inc., Peterson
Allied Jackson, Inc., Jack W. Peterson, and Alan D. AUred for transferring equity ownership in
Peteison ADred Inc. resultingfromthe merger of Jackson Downs & Associates Financial
Semces I i C wifhPeterson Allied Inc., and the subsequent transfer of my ownershiptoD. Scott
Jackson.

Dennis W. Jackson

Date

I, Karen Jackson, do hereby relinquish any claim against Peterson Allred 3hc,8 Peterson Allred
Jackson, Inc, Jack W, Peterson, and Alan D, Allred for transferring equity ownership in
Peterson Allred Inc. resultingfromthe merger of Jackson Downs & Associates Pioancial
Services IXC with Peterson Allied Inc., and the subsequent transfer of my ownership to D. Scott
Jackson.

Karen Jackson

ID -P-6 -o f
Date

SCHEDULE 2

1 January 1, 2002
I June 1, 2002
I January 1, 2003
Ijune 1, 2003
ijanuary 1,2004
| June 1,2004
| January 1,2005
fjune 1,2005
I January 1,2006
| June 1, 2006
Ijamiaiy 1,2007
I June 1, 2007
IJanuary l , 2008
| June 1,2008
|Janua»y 1,2D0Q
| June t, 200$
Total Peterson Note

2,300
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
1,925
53,425 <a>

1.0000
0.9678
0.9246
0.8948
0.8548
0.8273
0.7903
0.7649
0.7307
0.7072
0.6756
0.6756
0.6756
0.W56
0,6756
0.6756

2,500
3,387
3,236
3,132
2,992
2,896
2,766
2,677
2,557
2,475
2,365
2,365
2,365
2,365
2,365
*.301
41 f 742 fa>

1 January 1. 2002
I June I, 2002
IJanuary 1,2003
iJune 1, 2003
ijanuary 1,2004
Ijune 1, 2004
Ijanuary 1,2005
|june 1, 2005
ijanuary 1.2006
|June 1, 2006
I January 1, 2007
I June 1. 2007
I January 1, 2008
| June 1, 2008
Ijanuaiy 1,2009
iJune 1 2009
Totat Allred flote

2,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3.500
3,500
1.925
53,425 ja)

1.0000
0.9678
0.9246
0.8946
0.8548
0.8273
0.7903
0.7649
0.7307
0.7072
0.6756
0.6756
0.6756
0.6756
0.6756
0.6756

2,500
3,387
3,236
3,132
2,992
2,896
2,766
2,677
2 557
2,475
2,365
2,365
2365
2,365
2,365
1301
41,742 6>>

3,150
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
5350
100,000 <a>

0.5589
0.5339
0.5167
0.4936
0.4778
0.4564
0.4417
0 4220
0.4084
03901
0J3776
0.3607
0.3491
0.3335
0.3228

1,761
3,737
3,617
3,455
3,345
3,195
3,092
2,954
2,859
2,731
2,643
2,525
2,444
2,335
1,888
42,579 ftrt

[Uund l, 2009
I lanuary 1, 2010
I June 1, 2010
1 January 1,2011
f June 1, 2011
Ijanuary 1, 2012
3 June 1,2012
f January 1, 2013
I June 1, 2013
afJanuaiy 1,2014
*June 1,2014
pjanuaiy 1, 2015
|jJune 1, 2015
a January 1, 2016
^June 1, 201b
Total Dennis & Karen Note
flu tuple Calculation
Total Payments - Sum <a>
Gros*» Revenues at time of Jackson's Purchase
Jackson's Original Puithase Percentage
1/3 of Git>Sb Revenues {c> i {d>

Jackson's Gioss Revenue Puiichase Multiple <b> / {e>

206,850 {b>
750,000 <c>
33 33% {d>
250,000 {e>
0 83 NondtecountW

126,063
750 000
33 33%
250,000
0.50

{b>
{c}
id}
ie>
Discounted

SCHEDULE 3
Summary of Derived Values by Expert
Illustrative of Value Central Tendency
Derived Value of
PAJ before

Value of Peterson's 36.37%
Ownership before Personal
Goodwill Allocation

Personal Goodwill
Valuation Approach

Expert

Valuation Method

Allocation

income
Income
Biend (Income/Asset)
income
Market
Market

Capitalization of Earnings
Average of Value Range
Excess Earnings
Average of Inome Methods
Historical Transaction
Historical Transaction

Bowles
Jackson
Bowles
Townsend
Court
Bowles

600.000
650,000
660,942
734,388
790,889
819,120

Market

Average of Market Methods Townsend

1,618,547

{a}

ft>>

Reference

218,220
236,405
240,385
267,097
287,646
297,914

Bowles Report, Exhibit 8 (page 21)
Jackson's court testimony
Bowles Report, Exhibit 8 (page 21)
Townsend Report, Schedule A
Court's Decision dated 4/17/2009
Bowles Report, Exhibit 8 (page 21)

588,665

Townsend Report Schedule A

{a} Jackson testified at court he believed the value to range from $600,000 to $700,000
{b} Derived using the correct present value multiple

Value of Peterson's 36.37% Ownership
before Personal Goodwill Allocation

Value of PAJ before Personal Goodwill
Allocation
700,000

1,700,000

1,500,000
600,000
1,300,000

500,000
1,100,000

900,000

• Townsend Values

• Townsend Values

• Bowles Values

• Bowles Values

400,000

A Jackson Value
700,000

500,000

r

A Jackson Value

• Court Values

• Court Values
300,000

200,000
300,000

100,000

100.000
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Mark Hancey (USB 06884)
HANCEY LAW OFFICES
121N. Springcreek Pkwy.; Suite 200
Providence, Utah 84332
Telephone: (435)787-1444
Facsimile: (435) 755-5152
Attorneyfor Defendants, Counterclaim Plaintiffs
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JACK W.PETERSON
Plaintiff and
Counterclaim Defendant
v.

)
)
)
)

D. SCOTT JACKSON, individually; ALAN D. )
ALLRED, individually; and on behalf of
>
PETERSON ALLRED JACKSON, P.C., a
J
Utah Professional Corporation,
c
Defendants and
j
Counterclaim Plaintiffs
\

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
^ase No. 06-0102504
Judge: Kevin Allen

I hereby certify that on the IS01 day of May, 2009,1 mailed by first class postage pre-paid a true and
correct copy of the MOTIONS FOR AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT, RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND
AMENDMENT OF FINDINGS and MOTION TO STAY; REQUEST FOR HEARING and the
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS FOR AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT, RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT AND AMENDMENT OF FINDINGS and MOTION TO STAY; REQUEST FOR HEARING to:
James Jenkins, attorney for Plaintiff
OLSON & HOGGAN, ?.C.
Suite 200
130 South Main
Logan, Utah 84321
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 16. Corporations
*S Chapter 10A. Utah Revised Business Corporation Act
*i Part 14. Dissolution
-•§ 16-10a-1430. Grounds for judicial dissolution
(1) A corporation may be dissolved in a proceeding by the attorney general or the division director if it is established
that:
(a) the corporation obtained its articles of incorporation throughfraud;or
(b) the corporation has continued to exceed or abuse the authority conferred upon it by law.
(2) A corporation may be dissolved in a proceeding by a shareholder if it is established that:
(a) the directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs, the shareholders are unable to break
the deadlock, irreparable injury to the corporation is threatened or being suffered, or the business and affairs of the
corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders generally, because of the deadlock;
(b) the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal,
oppressive, or fraudulent;
(c) the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power and have failed, for a period that includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose terms have expired or would have expired
upon the election of their successors; or
(d) the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.
(3) A corporation may be dissolved in a proceeding by a creditor if it is established that:
(a) the creditor's claim has been reduced to judgment, the execution on the judgment has been returned unsatisfied, and the corporation is insolvent; or
(b) the corporation is insolvent and the corporation has admitted in writing that the creditor's claim is due and owing.
(4) A corporation may be dissolved in a proceeding by the corporation to have its voluntary dissolution continued
under court supervision.
CREDIT(S)
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Corporations5 02.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 101k502.
C.J.S. Corporations § 716.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Encyclopedias
92 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 163, Establishing Liability for Minority Shareholder Oppression.
Treatises and Practice Aids
Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private Corp. ? 8025, Judicial Supervision of Voluntary' Dissolution.
Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private Corp. $ 8078, Creditors.
Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private Corp. g 5820.10, Oppressed Shareholders.
Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private Corp. $ 8046.10, Illegal, Oppressive, or Fraudulent Conduct of Directors or Controlling Shareholders.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
In general I
Causes and grounds, generally 2
Deficiency of members or officers 6
Invalid orfraudulentcorporation 3
Loss or transfer of capital or property 7
Nonuser or surrender offranchise4
Violation of charter or statute 5
1. In general
Within statute providing for suspension of powers, rights and privileges of corporation delinquent in payment of
franchise taxes, term "suspended" imports temporary restriction of function of corporation, something less than termination of corporate life as brought about by dissolution. U.C.A. 1953, 16-1-2, 16-10-1 etseq., 16-10-100, 16-10101, 59-13-62, 59-13-63. Macka\ & Knobel Enterprises. Inc. v. Teton Van Gas. Inc.. 1969. 23 Utah 2d 200. 460
P,2d 828. Corporations 592.5
Legislature which provides for creation of corporations may provide that particular omissions or acts should operate
to end their existence and permit forfeiture to be declared by administrative officers. Const, art. 5, $ 1; art. 8. § 1.
Citizens' Club v. Welling. 1933. 83 Utah 81, 27 P.2d 23. Corporations 592.5
2. Causes and grounds, generally
Liquidation of medical corporation was proper where stock in corporation was transferred to nonprofessional creditor of bankrupt shareholder, corporation did not provide in its articles, in its bylaws, or by private agreement for repurchase or redemption of shares upon disqualification of shareholder, and corporation failed to purchase shares of
bankrupt shareholder at their "reasonable fair value" within 90 days after transfer. U.C.A.1953, 16-11-13. Riche v.
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North Ogden Professional Corp.. 1988. 763 P.2d 1210, certiorari granted 773 P.2d 45. affirmed 784 P.2d 1126.
Corporations 592
3. Invalid orfraudulentcorporation
While Rev. St. 1898, §§ 318, 319, requiring the filing of the original articles of incorporation with the secretary of
state, are mandatory, and apply equally to any amendment thereof which is fundamental (section 339, Rev. St.
1898), a failure to file an amendment which is not fundamental, such as an increase of the number of its board of
directors, is not vital, and would form no basis for a direct proceeding by the state to forfeit the charter of such corporation. Jackson v. Crown Point Min. Co.. 1899, 21 Utah 1, 59 P. 238, 81 Am.St.Rep. 651, Unreported.
Corporations 593
4. Nonuser or surrender of franchise
That a corporation was without directors and officers and had entirely ceased to do business did not deprive it from
being a corporation and continuing to exist as such. Jones Mining Co. v. Cardiff Min. & Mill. Co., 1920. 56 Utah
449, 191 P. 426. Corporations 596
5. Violation of charter or statute
Nevada statutes requiring payment of fees forfilinglist of officers of corporation and imposing penalties for failure
to comply with such statutes are construed as "revenue measures", and third parties may not make any issue of failure to comply with such requirements unless clearly injured by reason of such default. Comp.Laws Nev. §§ 18041808. Buhler v. Maddison, 1943. 105 Utah 39. 140 P.2d 933. Corporations 599
6. Deficiency of members or officers
In the absence of statute to the contrary want of the required officers does not dissolve a corporate entity. Buhler v.
Maddison, 1943, 105 Utah 39. 140 P.2d 933. Corporations 600
7. Loss or transfer of capital or property
A corporation is not dissolved by the mere transfer of its property to a trustee for the purpose of paying its debts.
Wveth Hardware & Manufacturing Co v. James-Spencer-Bateman Co.. 1897, 15 Utah 110. 47 P. 604. Corporations
603
U.C.A. 1953 § 16-10a-1430, UT ST § 16-10a-1430
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 16. Corporations
*1 Chapter 10A. Utah Revised Business Corporation Act
*ii Part 14. Dissolution
-*§ 16-10a-1434. Election to purchase in lieu of dissolution
(1) In a proceeding under Subsection 16-10a-143 0(2) to dissolve a corporation that has no shares listed on a national
securities exchange or regularly traded in a market maintained by one or more members of a national or affiliated
securities association, the corporation may elect, or if it fails to elect, one or more shareholders may elect to purchase all shares of the corporation owned by the petitioning shareholder, at the fair value of the shares, determined
as provided in this section. An election pursuant to this section is irrevocable unless the court determines that it is
equitable to set aside or modify the election.
(2)(a) An election to purchase pursuant to this section may be filed with the court at any time within 90 days after
thefilingof the petition under Subsection 16-10a-143 0(2) or at any later time as the court in its discretion may allow. If the corporation files an election with the court within the 90-day period, or at any later time allowed by the
court, to purchase all shares of the corporation owned by the petitioning shareholder, the corporation shall purchase
the shares in the manner provided in this section.
(b) If the corporation does not file an election with the court within the time period, but an election to purchase all
shares of the corporation owned by the petitioning shareholder isfiledby one or more shareholders within the
time period, the corporation shall, within ten days after the later of:
(i) the end of the time period allowed for thefilingof elections to purchase under this section; or
(ii) notification from the court of an election by shareholders to purchase all shares of the corporation owned by
the petitioning shareholder as provided in this section, give written notice of the election to purchase to all
shareholders of the corporation, other than the petitioning shareholder. The notice shall state the name and
number of shares owned by the petitioning shareholder and the name and number of shares owned by each
electing shareholder. The notice shall advise any recipients who have not participated in the election of their
right to join in the election to purchase shares in accordance with this section, and of the date by which any notice of intent to participate must befiledwith the court.
(c) Shareholders who wish to participate in the purchase of sharesfromthe petitioning shareholder must file
notice of their intention to join in the purchase by the electing shareholders, no later than 30 days after the
effective date of the corporation's notice of their right to join in the election to purchase.
(d) All shareholders who havefiledwith the court an election or notice of their intention to participate in the
election to purchase the shares of the corporation owned by the petitioning shareholder thereby become irrevocably obligated to participate in the purchase of sharesfromthe petitioning shareholders upon the terms and
conditions of this section, unless the court otherwise directs.
(e) After an election has beenfiledby the corporation or one or more shareholders, the proceedings under Subsection 16-10a-1430(2) may not be discontinued or settled, nor may the petitioning shareholder sell or otherwise dis-
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pose of any shares of the corporation, unless the court determines that it would be equitable to the corporation and
the shareholders, other than the petitioning shareholders, to permit any discontinuance, settlement, sale, or other
disposition.
(3) If, within 60 days after the earlier of:
(a) the corporation'sfilingof an election to purchase all shares of the corporation owned by the petitioning shareholder; or
(b) the corporation's mailing of a notice to its shareholders of thefilingof an election by the shareholders to
purchase all shares of the corporation owned by the petitioning shareholder, the petitioning shareholder and
electing corporation or shareholders reach agreement as to the fair value and terms of purchase of the petitioning
shareholder's shares, the court shall enter an order directing the purchase of petitioner's shares, upon the terms and
conditions agreed to by the parties.
(4) If the parties are unable to reach an agreement as provided for in Subsection (3), upon application of any party
the court shall stay the proceedings under Subsection 16-10a-143 0(2) and determine the fair value of the petitioning
shareholder's shares as of the day before the date on which the petition under Subsection 16-10a-1430(2) was filed
or as of any other date the court determines to be appropriate under the circumstances and based on the factors the
court determines to be appropriate.
(5)(a) Upon determining the fair value of the shares of the corporation owned by the petitioning shareholder, the
court shall enter an order directing the purchase of the shares upon terms and conditions the court determines to be
appropriate. The terms and conditions may include payment of the purchase price in installments, where necessary
in the interests of equity, provision for security to assure payment of the purchase price and any additional costs,
fees, and expenses awarded by the court, and an allocation of shares among shareholders if the shares are to be purchased by shareholders.
(b) In allocating the petitioning shareholders' shares among holders of different classes of shares, the court shall
attempt to preserve the existing distribution of voting rights among holders of different share classes to the extent
practicable. The court may direct that holders of a specific class or classes shall not participate in the purchase.
The court may not require any electing shareholder to purchase more of the shares of the corporation owned by
the petitioning shareholder than the number of shares that the purchasing shareholder may have set forth in his
election or notice of intent to participate filed with the court as the maximum number of shares he is willing to
purchase.
(c) Interest may be allowed at the rate andfromthe date determined by the court to be equitable. However, if the
courtfindsthat the refusal of the petitioning shareholder to accept an offer of payment was arbitrary or otherwise
not in good faith, interest may not be allowed.
(d) If the courtfindsthat the petitioning shareholder had probable grounds for relief under Subsection 16-10a1430(2)(b) or (d), it may award to the petitioning shareholder reasonable fees and expenses of counsel and experts
employed by the petitioning shareholder.
(6) Upon entry of an order under Subsection (3) or (5), the court shall dismiss the petition to dissolve the corporation
under Section 16-10a-1430, and the petitioning shareholder shall no longer have any rights or status as a shareholder
of the corporation, except the right to receive the amounts awarded to him by the court. The award is enforceable in
the same manner as any other judgment.
(7)(a) The purchase ordered pursuant to Subsection (5) shall be made within ten days after the date the order be-
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comesfinal,unless before that time the corporation files with the court a notice of its intention to adopt articles of
dissolution pursuant to Sections 16-10a-1402 and 16-10a-1403. The articles of dissolution must then be adopted and
filed within 50 days after notice.
(b) Upon filing of the articles of dissolution, the corporation is dissolved in accordance with the provisions of
Sections 16-10a-1405 through 16-10a-1408. and the order entered pursuant to Subsection (5) is no longer of any
force or effect. However, the court may award the petitioning shareholder reasonable fees and expenses in accordance with the provisions of Subsection (5)(d). The petitioning shareholder may continue to pursue any claims
previously asserted on behalf of the corporation.
(8) Any payment by the corporation pursuant to an order under Subsection (3) or (5), other than an award of fees
and expenses pursuant to Subsection (5)(d), is subject to the provisions of Section 16-10a-64Q.
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EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT^
1.1 In consideration of my employment with Peterson Allred Nelson, Inc., a Utah professional
corporation(the Employer), I, Jack W. Peterson,(Employee) hereby agree to abide by the following
terms and conditions relating to my employment with the Employe?.
1.2 I understand my compensation will be as shown in the attached "Schedule of Compensation"
plus benefits as outlined in the current Employer's written statements. The Employer and Employee
may, from time to time, reflect changes in the Employee's compensation as may be mutually agreed
upon by executing the changes as shown on the attached "Schedule of Compensation".
1.3 I will devote my best efforts and time in fulfilling my responsibilities in the performance of the
Employer's business. My progress will be reviewed during each calendar year and any changes in
my compensation or position will be stated in writing and considered amendments to this
agreement.
1.4 I understand that my employment relationship is at will. I further agree that nothing contained
in any policies or rules, or any representations to the contrary, will in any manner alter that
relationship, other than a signed writing executed by the managing officer of the Employer.
1.5 I have read and understand Employer policies and rules as set forth in the Employer's written
statements. I agree to abide by those policies and rules and any subsequent changes as set forth in
writing from time to time by the Employer, and to abide by any confidentiality restrictions the
Employer may require of me. I further agree not to obligate the Employer to any contractual
agreement or undertaking without the express approval of the managing officer of the Employer.
1.6 The Employer may terminate this relationship without cause, upon giving a two week notice. I
may terminate this relationship without cause, upon giving a two week notice. Furthermore, the
Employer may terminate my employment for cause without notice. "Cause" will include: any acts
of dishonesty; knowing violations of Employer's policy; violations of applicable laws, rules, or
regulations regarding professional demeanor or ethics; breach of this agreement; or acts of
insubordination. I understand that those notice provisions are in lieu of any severance
arrangements.
2.0 I will not-1. For a period of two years after the termination of this agreement:
a.

Directly or indirectly solicit to provide or provide any professional services such as
those provided by the Employer for anyone who was a client of the Employer
anytime during the twelve months prior to the termination of my employment with
the Employer. This provision does not apply to clients who are my immediate
family members.

b.

Directly or indirectly, without the prior written consent of the Employer, solicit for
employment with myself or any firm or entity with which I am associated, any
employee of the Employer or otherwise disrupt, impair, damage, or interfere with
the Employer's relationship with its employees; and

2. Upon the termination of my employment, remove, retain, copy, or utilize any
confidential, privileged or proprietary information, trade secrets, or other property of the
Employer, including but not limited to manuals, software, data files, client lists or
materials, other data publications or materials, or financial information about the
Employer or any of it's owners or employees.
2.1 The non-compete provisions contained within section 2.0 of this agreement will not apply to a
client of the Employer for whom I performed services or with whom I had significant professional
contact prior lo joining the Employer as shown in the attached "Schedule of Non-Compete
Exceptions".
2.2 If this employment contract is terminated by either party, and any of the non-compete
provisions of sections 2.0 and 2.1 of this agreement are violated, I agree to pay the Employer an
amount equal to 100% of the prior twelve months billings plus the balance of unbilled work-inprogress on the date of termination of employment to such clients. This amount shall be payable
over two years, with one-half of the amount payable by January 1 of each year.
3.0 Insofar as any terms or conditions set forth in this agreement are found by a court of law to be
unenforceable, then the remaining terms and conditions shall remain in full force and effect and
those terms or conditions, if any, found to be unenforceable shall be modified to conform to the
most expansive permissible reading under the law.
3.1 Any and all prior or contemporaneous agreements, whether written or oral, concerning the
terms and conditions of employment shall be superseded by this agreement. This agreement may
not be amended other than in writing signed by the managing officer of the Employer.
4.0 The defaulting party to any provisions of this agreement agrees to pay any expenses incurred by
the nondefaulting party to protect its rights herein, including, but not limited to court costs and a
reasonable attorney's fee.
5.0 This agreement, and itsinterpretation shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah.

/Agreed by Employee, Jack W. Peterson

Date

PETERSON ALLRED NELSON, INC.

Agreed by Managing Officer, Gordon L. Nelson

Date

SCHEDULE OF COMPENSATION
Employer hereby agrees to compensate Jack W. Peterson, Employee, as shown below. If the
frequency shown below is "hourly", any hours worked over 40 in any calendar week shall be paid at
1.5 times the regular rate. All others shall be paid overtime once a year at their hourly rate
multiplied by the hours worked exceeding the standard. For purposes of this contract, a standard
work year will be 2080 hours.
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SCHEDULE OF NON-COMPETE EXCEPTIONS
Client Name
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Chapter 13 Econometric Modeling. ModdSpec$catk)n and Diagnostic Testing 493

Model Selection Criteria
In this section we discuss several criteria that have been used to choose among competing
models and/or to compare models for forecasting purposes. Here we distinguish between
In-sample forecasting and out-of-sample forecasting. In-sample forecasting essentially
tells us how the chosen modelfitsthe data in a given sample. Out-of-san^le forecasting is
concerned with detennining how afittedmodelforecastsfuture values of the regressand,
givenfixevalues of the regressors.
Several criteria are used for this purpose. In particular; we discuss these criteria: (1) J?,
(2)adjusted 5 2 <= R2)9 (3) Akaike's^information criterion (AIQ, (4) Schwann's information
criterion (SIC), (5) Mallows's Cp criterion, and (6) forecast x2 (cM-square). All these criteria aim at minimizing the residual sum of squares (RSS) (or increasing tte
ever, excefrt ft* thefirstcriterion
*
an increasingly large number ofregressors. Thus there is a trade-offbetween goodness of ^
of the model and its complexity (as judged by the number ofregressors).

The R2 Criterion
We know that one of the measures of goodness offitof a regression model is R2, which, as
we know, is defined as:
i?^!|!=:I-g!
TSS
TSS

(13-9.1)
'

fl^Hityg dgfin^4 nf necessity lies between 0 and 1. The closer it is to 1, the better is the fit.
But there are problems with Rf+First, it measures in-sample goodness ot ht in me sensed! ~-^£
hew close an estimated J value is to its aetuai value m jhergrvm ganple. There is no guar- \
__
iasallJforecast well out-of-sample obseryaficms^a^/irf, m comparing two or
more $?% the dependent variable, or regressand, must be the same. Third, and more
importantly, an R2 cannotfellwhen more variables are added to the model. Therefore, there
is every temptation to play the game of "maximi2ing the i?2" by simply adding more variables to the model. Of course, adding more variables to the model may increase R2 but it
may also increase the variance of forecast error.

Adjusted R2
As a penalty for adding regressors to increase the R2 value, Henry Theil developed the
adjusted H2, denoted by if2, which ^studied in Chapter 7. Recall that

(13.9.2)

As you Can see from this formula, R2 < R2, showing how the adjusted R2 penalizes for
adding more regressors. As we noted in Chapter 8, unHkeU\the adjusted J?2 will increase
only if the absolute t value of the added variable is greater than 1. For comparative purposes, therefore, R2 is abetter measure than ^ . But again keep in mind that the regressand
must be the sameforthe comparison to be valid.

ADDENDUM

Judgment dated August 6,2009;
Memorandum Decision dated July 20, 2009;
Judgment dated May 6,2009;

^MR^

Memorandum Decision dated April 17,2009;

^

Notice of Appeal dated July 21,2009;
PAJ's Motion to Amend the Findings or Make Additional Findings \

^

i

Rule 52(b), Motion for Amendment of Judgment under Rule 59(a), I
for Relief from Judgment under Rule 60(a), (b)(1) and b(6), and a Motion
for Stay under Rule 62(b) dated May 15, 2009;
Peterson's Motion to Partially Amend orAlter Judgment under Rules 59(e)
and 60 dated May 18,2009^
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